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INTRODUCTION
The qualities of a good judge are easy to name but sometimes difficult 
to discern and almost always impossible to quantify: intelligence, integrity,
fairness, diligence, experience, judgment, perspective, compassion.1  The
Founders concluded the best way to ensure those qualities on the federal 
appellate bench was presidential appointment of judges, with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, and life tenure.2  By contrast, the states have 
employed a variety of selection systems over time, each aimed—at least 
ostensibly—at producing the highest-quality appellate judges.  But do any 
of the various selection methods produce appellate benches that are better 
than the others?  Do any produce appellate benches that are significantly 
different from the others?  Although several prior studies have sought to
examine these questions, this Article presents a different analysis based on a
broad set of data collected about each state appellate judge on the bench in
early 2015. The findings shed new light on the characteristics of benches
produced by the respective selection methods.3 
Today, voters in twenty-two states elect their appellate judges.4  When
judges run in partisan elections, the initial winnowing of the candidates is 
done by the voters in primary elections, when they occur, or by party
 1. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice:
An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23, 28–29 (2004) (proposing
means of measuring intellect, independence, effort, and quality of opinion-writing, based 
on objective performance measures); Lawrence B. Solum, A Tournament of Virtue, 32
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1365, 1367–85 (2005) (discussing largely unquantifiable judicial 
“virtues,” including incorruptibility, sobriety, courage, temperament, impartiality, diligence,
carefulness, intelligence, learnedness, craft, skill, justice, equity, and “practical wisdom”).
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
3. See discussion infra Part III.  The Author collected and analyzed the data 
described in the present Article.
4. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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leadership, in the absence of contested primaries.  In non-partisan election
states, unable to rely on overt assistance from political parties, most judicial
candidates are on their own to persuade voters of their qualifications.
Although elections may not be the best means of ensuring high-quality
judges—among other reasons, some unknowable proportion of the best 
would-be judges, by temperament, simply would never enter a campaign 
fray—proponents believe those concerns are outweighed by the accountability
that elections impose on judges.5 
Two states leave the selection of their appellate judges to the legislature.6 
In those states, judicial aspirants need not engage in traditional election
campaigns; but, of course, the involvement of popularly elected legislators
means that judicial selection in those two states is not free of politics.
In the other twenty-six states, the governor appoints members of the
appellate courts.7  Each of those states employs, to a greater or lesser degree, 
at least one element of what proponents call “merit selection,”8 in which
the governor’s appointment power is constrained by an independent
commission made up of both lawyers and non-lawyers who extensively
review the qualifications of the applicants, then nominate candidates for
appointment by the governor.  In half of those states, the governor’s power 
is further constrained by the requirement that the appointment be confirmed
by a legislative or other elected body.  Appointment systems are designed 
to free judicial candidates and judges from the appearance of conflicts— 
and actual conflicts—that may be unavoidable consequences of political 
campaigns and campaign fundraising in election systems.  Proponents of 
appointment systems also believe the governor and the independent bodies 
that review and nominate prospective appointees are better than the voters 
in determining which judicial candidates have the necessary qualities for
the bench.  On the other hand, critics argue merit selection and like appointment 
systems unduly advantage the holders of traditional power in the legal world:
bar associations, business interests, and large law firms. 
This is a study of the objective characteristics of judges on state appellate 
benches produced by the five different selection methods: partisan election, 
5. See, e.g., CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 7 (2009) (“Overall, we would expect judges chosen by democratic processes 
to reflect the political preferences of their states at the time they are chosen but also to be 
brought into line with the dominant coalition in the state by threat of electoral sanction.”). 
6. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
7. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
8. “Merit selection” is used throughout this Article to describe a selection process 
in which the governor appoints a judge from a slate of nominees proposed by an
independent commission that has vetted and interviewed the applicants.  In most merit-
selection states, once appointed, a judge is subject to retention election at regular intervals 
thereafter.  See discussion infra Part II.B. 
832
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non-partisan election, legislative selection, merit selection, and “merit– 
confirmation.”9  Although judges’ subjective differences cannot be quantified, 
this Article analyzes a broad range of objective attributes, including gender, 
race, age, and the nature of a judge’s prior legal experience, as well as
arguably objective credentials such as judicial clerkships and attendance
at ranked universities and law schools.10 
The analysis starts from the premise that diversity enhances any appellate
bench. Diverse life and work experiences, points of view, and educational 
backgrounds, as well as diversity in race, ethnicity, and gender, improve the
work of an appellate bench.  Diverse perspectives, knowledge and life
experience promote a more robust exchange among the members of an
appellate panel.11  The broader a panel’s collection of perspectives and
experiences, the more informed its decision-making will be.12 Not 
9. “Merit-confirmation” is used throughout this Article to describe a selection process in
which the governor nominates a judge after receiving the recommendation of an 
independent commission; the governor’s nominee then must be confirmed by a separately
elected body. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
10. The nature of state appellate courts—in which panels of judges collaboratively
decide cases—makes the appellate system a good subject for a study such as this, which considers
the mix of characteristics possessed by judges on courts selected by various means. But 
the observations about the effects of selection methods also may apply, to some extent, to 
state trial court judges. 
11. See Kathleen A. Bratton & Rorie L. Spill, Existing Diversity and Judicial Selection:
The Role of the Appointment Method in Establishing Gender Diversity in State Supreme 
Courts, 83 SOC. SCI. Q. 504, 504–05 (2002); Sheldon Goldman, Should There Be Affirmative
Action for the Judiciary?, 62 JUDICATURE 488, 494 (1979). 
12. There is conflicting evidence about whether gender, race, or ethnicity affects
how a judge decides cases.  Henry R. Glick & Craig F. Emmert, Selection Systems and
Judicial Characteristics: The Recruitment of State Supreme Court Judges, 70 JUDICATURE
228, 235 (1987); Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Diversity in State and Federal 
Appellate Courts: Change and Continuity Across 20 Years, 29 JUST. SYS. J. 47, 49 (2008).
Multi-judge appellate panels are the best source of statistical analyses for this issue,
but generally speaking, researchers find little to no effect on the outcomes of cases due to
the presence of diversity among federal appellate panels. Boyd, Epstein, and Martin found
significant differences, however, in how male and female judges decide gender discrimination
cases.  Christina L. Boyd et al., Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 389, 401 (2010).  And the presence of a female judge on an appeals panel tends
to cause male judges to favor the plaintiff in gender discrimination cases.  Id. at 406; see
also Elaine Martin & Barry Pyle, Gender and Racial Diversification of State Supreme
Courts, 24 WOMEN & POL. 35, 36 (2002). Other researchers see the same effects with black 
federal appellate judges.  Using matching methods, Kastellec showed that black judges are 
significantly more likely than comparable non-black appellate judges to vote in favor of
affirmative action programs.  Jonathan P. Kastellec, Racial Diversity and Judicial Influence on
Appellate Courts, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 167, 168 (2013).  Moreover, as in the study by Boyd, 
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incidentally, diversity also enhances and widens public respect for the 
courts.13 
This Article analyzes detailed career-path and other demographic data
to determine the extent to which the various judicial selection methods
advance diverse candidates to the bench. The results show many similarities
among the mix of objective characteristics found on appellate benches across
the states, regardless of selection method, but there are some important
differences:
	 “Merit-confirmation,” in which the governor’s appointment power is
constrained both by an independent nominating commission
that reviews and vets the applicants and also by an elected body 
with the power to confirm or reject the eventual appointee, produces
the most distinctive bench.  Appellate judges in merit-confirmation 
states tend to have more years of legal experience and include
proportionately more former prosecutors, more other former
government lawyers, more former judicial clerks, and more 
appointees with other prior judicial experience.14 
	 Proportionately more appellate judges in election states come
from private practice than in merit-selection or merit-confirmation 
states.  Fewer of them have prior judicial experience, and more of
them were educated locally. Many judges in election states,
however, first come to the bench when they are appointed to fill
an interim vacancy. Although the prior literature had understood
that the objective characteristics of those appointees generally are
similar to their elected counterparts, this study shows that is not 
always so, at least with respect to career paths and some objective 
et al., a black appellate judge may have a multiplier effect in certain cases; non-black
judges tend to vote differently on race-based affirmative action cases when they sit on a 
panel with a black judge. Id. at 175, 177.  Because the presence of a black judge on a 
panel increases the chance that a non-black judge will vote in favor of affirmative action
by 20%, a black judge’s presence on a three-judge panel “nearly ensures that the panel will vote
in favor of an affirmative action program.” Id. at 168. 
13. See Hurwitz & Lanier, supra note 12, at 49; see also Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging
the Judges: Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39
B.C. L. REV. 95, 138 (1997) (“With public confidence in the justice system plummeting, 
many argue that racial diversity on the bench will help disaffected racial minorities, in
particular, to believe that they have a voice in the administration of justice.”); KATE BERRY, 
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., BUILDING A DIVERSE BENCH: A GUIDE FOR JUDICIAL NOMINATING
COMMISSIONERS 4 (2016); TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H. YOON, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, 
THE GAVEL GAP: WHO SITS IN JUDGMENT ON STATE COURTS? 3 (2016); CIARA TORRES­
SPELLISCY ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., IMPROVING JUDICIAL DIVERSITY 4 (2010) 
(“Diversity on the bench is intimately linked to the American promise to provide equal 
justice for all.”).
14. See infra Table 1. 
834
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demographics. In several respects, most notably race, these
appointed judges are significantly different from their elected
counterparts.  The distinctive characteristics of the appointed
judges tend to bring the overall characteristics of the appellate 
benches in elected states more in line with the national norm 
across all selection methods.15 
	 Nationwide, women are represented on state appellate benches
at a rate slightly higher than their numbers among the practicing 
bar. By a significant margin, however, female candidates are 
disadvantaged by merit selection, but not by merit-confirmation. 
The data suggest that merit selection does not value private-
practice or business-law experience in women to the same extent
it values that experience in men.  On the other hand, merit selection
favors women with prior government-law experience and those 
who have served judicial clerkships.16 
	 Finally, non-whites are represented across and within all selection 
methods at rates roughly equivalent to their representation in the
bar. By a significant margin, however, non-whites on the bench are
disproportionately female.17 
Part I discusses the history of judicial selection in the states and reviews
the prior empirical and theoretical literature concerning judicial selection
methods and the differences among judges produced by those selection
methods, mainly with respect to gender, race, and localism.  Part II identifies 
the data gathered for this analysis and describes the particulars of the five
methods of judicial selection employed by the states.  As noted above, many
states elect their appellate judges; in other states, judges are chosen by a formal 
merit-selection protocol; and in two states, the legislature selects appellate 
judges.  Prior studies categorized appellate judges in all the other states as
simply “appointed.”  Upon close review of the relevant legal mechanisms in
those states, this Article concludes it is more appropriate to recognize that 
their judicial-selection protocols resemble those in merit-selection states,
except that in these “merit-confirmation” states, the governor’s appointment 
power also is constrained by the requirement that a separate elected body,
 15. See infra Table 4. 
16. See infra Table 5, Table 6, Table 7, Table 8, Table 9, Table 10, Table 11. 
17. See infra Table 12, Table 13. 
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usually the legislature, must approve any appointee before he or she may
take the bench.
Part III describes the results of the analysis.  The typical characteristics of 
the judges across all selection methods, including career paths, education
and other factors, are discussed first.  The analysis shows that, although
appellate benches in merit-selection states look much like those in election 
states, judges in merit-confirmation states display some significant differences.
Next, this Article addresses some implications of popular election of judges, 
including (1) differences between the characteristics of judges in election
states and those in merit-selection and merit-confirmation states; (2) differences 
in the characteristics of judges who first come to the bench in election states
by appointment, rather than by election; and (3) differences between benches 
produced by partisan elections and by non-partisan elections.  Finally, this 
Article discusses the proportionate representation of women and non-whites
on the various appellate benches. 
I. STATE APPELLATE-COURT JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS
A. A Brief History 
In the original thirteen states, judges either were appointed by the governor 
or chosen by the legislature.18  Within eighty years, apparently influenced 
by Jacksonian democratic principles, a majority of states turned to popular
election as a means of choosing their judges.19  Eventually, the pendulum
began to swing away from popular election, at least in some states.  Today’s
“merit selection” has its origin in a proposal made in 1914 by Albert Kales, a
co-founder of the American Judicature Society, or AJS.20 AJS endorsed merit 
selection in 1920, and the American Bar Association followed suit in 1937.21 
Missouri was the first state to put the AJS and ABA model into effect when it
adopted the “Nonpartisan Court Plan” in 1940.22  Under what is now called
the “Missouri Plan,” or merit selection, an independent commission made
18. Larry C. Berkson, Judicial Selection in the United States: A Special Report, 64 
JUDICATURE 176, 176 n.1 (1980). 
19. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 5, at 5; Berkson, supra note 18, at 176; Bradley
C. Canon, The Impact of Formal Selection Processes on the Characteristics of Judges–
Reconsidered, 6 LAW & SOC. REV. 579, 580 (1972); Rachel Paine Caufield, How the Pickers 
Pick: Finding a Set of Best Practices for Judicial Nominating Commissions, 34 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 163, 167 (2007). 
20. G. Alan Tarr, Designing an Appointive System: The Key Issues, 34 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 291, 293 (2007). 
21. G. ALAN TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE STATES 65 (2012).
22. Penny J. White & Malia Reddick, A Response to Professor Fitzpatrick: The Rest of
the Story, 75 TENN. L. REV. 501, 536 (2008). 
836
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up of lawyers and non-lawyers interviews judicial candidates, then forwards
its nominees to the governor, who must appoint one of the individuals the
commission has nominated.  Once on the bench, merit-selected judges run 
at regular intervals in uncontested retention elections.23 
Many other states adopted some version of merit selection during the 1960s 
and 1970s.24  Some proponents thought that because judicial applicants 
would not need to trade on partisan or other political involvement, merit 
selection would draw highly qualified individuals who might eschew an 
electoral process.25  As a state supreme court justice in an election state said, 
“Why would a person want to give up their legal career to go out and
campaign . . . you’re going to have to [go] out and campaign for a long time, 
to counter the money, and it’s going to get ugly and it’s going to get dirty . . .
Why would people want to do that?”26 
Advocates argued merit selection would eliminate partisanship, politics,
fundraising, and attendant perceived or actual influence-trading among
judges.27  Elected judges, it was thought, might owe their positions to patronage
or to campaign donors and might be improperly influenced to rule in favor
of those interests.28  At the very least, the perception of justice is tarnished 
when the public believes judges may be influenced by campaign donors who 
helped put them on the bench.29  Retired Justice Sandra Day O’Connor put
 23. See infra Part II.B.4.
 24. See AM. BAR ASS’N, JUDICIAL SELECTION: THE PROCESS OF CHOOSING JUDGES
7 (June 2008). 
25. See Henry R. Glick, The Promise and the Performance of the Missouri Plan: Judicial
Selection in the Fifty States, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 509, 513 (1978); see also Caufield, supra
note 19, at 174 (explaining that some number of highly qualified candidates may prefer to 
seek commission-based appointment because they are unwilling or unable to raise money
for an election campaign).
26. SCOTT GREYTAK, ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., BANKROLLING THE BENCH 11 
(2015).
27. Glick, supra note 25, at 511–12; Laura Denvir Stith & Jeremy Root, The Missouri 
Nonpartisan Court Plan: The Least Political Method of Selecting High Quality Judges, 74 
MO. L. REV. 711, 713 (2009). 
28. Glick, supra note 25, at 512. 
29. JUSTICE AT STAKE CAMPAIGN, MARCH 2004 SURVEY HIGHLIGHTS: AMERICANS 
SPEAK OUT ON JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 1 (2004), http://www.justiceatstake.org/media/cms/Zogby
PollFactSheet_54663DAB970C6.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HVQ-H7TM]; JUSTICE AT STAKE
CAMPAIGN, JUSTICE AT STAKE FREQUENCY QUESTIONNAIRE 7 (2001), http://www.justiceat
stake.org/media/cms/JASNationalSurveyResults_6F537F99272D4.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J8UU-JM7V].  According to Bonneau & Hall, 79% of businesspeople polled believed that 
contributions to judicial campaigns influence judges’ decisions.  BONNEAU & HALL, supra
note 5, at 105. 
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the point plainly: “Unsurprisingly, people who live in states that hold 
partisan judicial elections are considerably more distrusting of their judges, 
and they’re less likely to believe that the judges act fairly and impartially, 
and they’re more likely to agree that judges are just politicians in robes.”30 
And state judicial election campaigns can be quite expensive, particularly
at the appellate level.31 
Merit selection was supported as a way to “free judges from continuous
partisan political obligations, permitting them to become genuinely independent 
both on and off the bench and able to devote themselves full-time to their 
court duties.”32  Some recent high-profile retention elections involving 
merit-selected judges on state supreme courts have seen campaign spending 
akin to the most hotly contested partisan or non-partisan elections.33  Outside 
of those isolated instances, however, fundraising is irrelevant to most 
retention elections; by contrast, any judge facing a contested election must
be prepared to solicit donations to finance his or her campaign.  Finally,
although partisanship may influence the governor’s appointments in a merit- 
selection state, the fact that, by law, nominating commissions usually must
be bipartisan tends to reduce partisanship influences on the nomination
process.34 
This is not to say that popular election of judges lacks support in the
scholarship. Bonneau and Hall, who closely studied data relating to state
supreme court elections between 1990 and 2004, concluded, “[J]udicial 
elections are powerful legitimacy-conferring institutions that enhance the 
quality of democracy and create an inextricable link between citizens and 
the judiciary.”35  The authors found “no systematic evidence” that hotly 
contested or expensive judicial campaigns undercut voters’ respect for the
judiciary.36  To the contrary, they concluded that greater campaign spending 
30. Sandra Day O’Connor, Symposium Keynote Address, State Judicial Independence–
A National Concern, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 561, 564 (2010). 
 31. During the 2013–14 campaign season, more than $34.5 million was spent on
state supreme court races in nineteen states.  GREYTAK ET AL., supra note 26, at 2.  Outside 
spending, including spending by independent social welfare organizations and political parties,
represented 40% of that amount. Id.  Candidates themselves raised and spent more than
$20 million in those races.  Id. at 9. Of the twenty-three contested judicial seats up during that
election season, twenty-one were won by the candidate who raised the most money. Id. at 
7. 
32. Glick, supra note 25, at 513. 
33. GREYTAK ET AL., supra note 26, at 20. 
34. KEVIN M. ESTERLING & SETH S. ANDERSEN, DIVERSITY AND THE JUDICIAL MERIT
SELECTION PROCESS: A STATISTICAL REPORT 11 (1999), http://judicialselection.us/uploads/
documents/Diversity_and_the_Judicial_Merit_Se_9C4863118945B.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6A2S-3JML]; see also BERRY, supra note 13. 
35. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 5, at 17. 
36. Id. at 29. 
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triggers greater voter participation, thereby “strengthen[ing] the critical 
linkage between citizens and the bench.”37 
Although the debate about the best means of judicial selection continues 
in the literature, states seem content to maintain their respective preferred 
methods.  Over the last twenty years, the number of state appellate benches
chosen by merit selection rose only by four.38  Today, thirty-three states and the 
District of Columbia use merit selection to choose at least some of their
judges.39 
B. Prior Empirical and Theoretical Literature
Acknowledging the difficulty of measuring judicial quality, considerable 
research nevertheless has sought insight into the results of the various judicial 
selection systems.  Some researchers have concluded that appointment
produces better benches than election.  Cann analyzed data from a nationwide 
survey of some 2,400 state judgesincluding both appellate courts and trial 
courts—by the Justice at Stake Campaign between 2001 and 2002.40 He
found that judges in merit-selection and what he called “appointment” states 
“rate their state court system significantly higher [in quality] than judges in
states where most judges are elected in partisan elections.”41  Studies show
that elected judges are disciplined more frequently than other judges.42 
Meanwhile, there is considerable evidence that elections may influence judicial 
decision-making, particularly in criminal cases.  Research collected by Berry 
found that television campaign commercials increasingly focus on judicial 
candidates’ rulings in criminal cases.43  And the more television commercials 
37. Id. at 30. 
38. Hurwitz & Lanier, supra note 12, at 52. 
39.  White & Reddick, supra note 22, at 536. 
40. Damon Cann, Beyond Accountability and Independence: Judicial Selection and
State Court Performance, 90 JUDICATURE 226, 229 (2007). 
41. Id. at 230.  The author did not explain how he distinguished merit-selection states
from “appointment” states; most of the states he classed as “appointment” presumably are in this 
study’s “merit-confirmation” category.
 42. Malia Reddick, Judging the Quality of Judicial Selection Methods: Merit Selection,
Elections, and Judicial Discipline, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y (2010), http://www.judicial 
selection.us/uploads/documents/Judging_the_Quality_of_Judicial_Sel_8EF0DC3806ED
8.pdf [https://perma.cc/DDX4-ATKB]; White & Reddick, supra note 22, at 537 n.243 
(collecting authorities); see also RACHEL PAINE CAUFIELD, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, INSIDE 
MERIT SELECTION: A NATIONAL SURVEY OF JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONERS 6–7 
(2012).
43. KATE BERRY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., HOW JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IMPACT CRIMINAL 
CASES 1 (2015). 
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broadcast during a campaign season, “the less likely state supreme court 
justices are, on average, to rule in favor of criminal defendants.”44 
Merit selection was intended to focus judicial selection on applicants’
professional and personal qualifications.45 In a survey conducted in 2011 of
members of state judicial nominating commissions, about 75% responded
that their nominees are more qualified than judges who would be chosen
by popular election.46  It has been argued that appointive systems are more
likely to produce judges with better education and more expertise, while
elections produce judges who are more responsive, accessible, and
accountable.47 In analyzing written opinions issued by state supreme courts, 
Choi, Gulati, and Posner posited that the different selection systems may
attract different kinds of individuals to the bench.48  They concluded that
appointed judges write higher-quality opinions than elected judges, but elected
judges write more opinions.49  The reason? Appointed judges “care about their
reputation among a national community of like-minded professionals,” but 
elected judges are more like politicians who “care about their reputation in the 
local community of lay voters and politicians.”50  Perhaps, the researchers 
concluded, various selection systems simply attract different judicial
personalities.51 
Much theoretical literature has considered whether the respective judicial 
selection methods may affect the gender, racial, or ethnic diversity of judges
on appellate benches.  Some critics of merit selection argue it disadvantages
women, minorities, and those with non-traditional legal backgrounds who 
are less able to muster support from those who can influence the nominating
 44. Id. at 2.  One study found that trial judges facing competitive election campaigns 
imposed more severe criminal sentences than judges facing retention elections.  Id. at 9 
(citing Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness 
on Incumbent Behavior, 2 Q.J. POL. SCI. 107, 108 (2007)).  But judges up for retention also may
be susceptible to campaign pressures.  Another study found that, based on a review of 
capital cases in thirty-seven states, appointed state supreme court justices voted to reverse 
death sentences in 26% of appeals, while justices facing retention elections voted to reverse in
15% of appeals, and justices facing competitive elections reversed only 11% of the time.
Dan Levine & Kristina Cooke, Uneven Justice: In States with Elected High Court Judges,
A Harder Line on Capital Punishment, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2015, 2:00 PM), http://www.
reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-deathpenalty-judges/ [https://perma.cc/XC2N­
7N9W].  Of course, many supporters of popular election of judges would not be dismayed 
by these observations. See generally BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 5. 
45. Glick, supra note 25, at 513. 
46. CAUFIELD, supra note 42, at 39. 
47. Victor Eugene Flango & Craig R. Ducat, What Difference Does Method of Judicial
Selection Make?, 5 JUST. SYS. J. 25, 25 (1979). 
48. Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case
for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 290, 327 (2008). 
49. Id. at 290. 
50. Id. at 292. 
51. Id. at 327. 
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commission or the governor.52  These critics contend merit-selection systems 
are too influenced by established bar associations, which they argue tend to
favor lawyers from large law firms and those associated with powerful business
interests.53  The result, they say, is that merit selection tends to reinforce elitist, 
majoritarian, and establishment decision-making.54  The particular concern is
that judges chosen by merit selection will tend to be non-diverse and predisposed
to favor conservative outcomes, often at the expense of economic, racial, or
cultural minorities.55 
This criticism is not aimed solely at perceived majoritarian influences 
on the governor, who is the final decision-maker in a merit-selection state;
the same claims also are leveled at the so-called independent nominating 
commissions that first vet judicial applicants in merit selection.56  Critics
of merit selection argue nominating commission members tend to come 
52. Hurwitz & Lanier, supra note 12, at 49.  A fewer number of critics argue that, to the
contrary, merit selection unduly empowers liberal interests because state bar associations, 
which often select members of judicial nominating commissions in merit-selection states, 
are more likely to be liberal than conservative.  Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit
Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 675, 676–77 (2009). 
53. Glick, supra note 25, at 532.  In Caufield’s survey of members of judicial 
nominating commissions in 2011, 36% self-identified as either strong or moderate Democrats; 
22% identified themselves as strong or moderate Republicans.  CAUFIELD, supra note 42, 
at 42. Although no information was provided about the political affiliation of the governors
who appointed the commissioners or the voter registration numbers in their states, Caufield
reported that commissioners appointed by the governor were both more likely to self-report as
“strong” Democrats or “strong or moderate” Republicans than commission members elected or
appointed by state bar associations.  Id.
54. Nicholas O. Alozie, Selection Methods and the Recruitment of Women to State 
Courts of Last Resort, 77 SOC. SCI.Q. 111, 112 (1996); Glick & Emmert, supra note 12, at 230; 
Barbara Luck Graham, Do Judicial Selection Systems Matter? A Study of Black Representation
on State Courts, 18 AM. POL. Q. 316, 32 (1990); Hurwitz & Lanier, supra note 12, at 50. 
55. George W. Crockett, Jr., Judicial Selection and the Black Experience, 58 
JUDICATURE 439, 441 (1975); Glick, supra note 25, at 532.  “Critics of merit selection have
long maintained that the process is dominated by state and local bar associations whose 
members overwhelmingly are white, male, Protestant, conservative ‘establishment’ attorneys 
who are inclined to favor their own with judicial positions.”  Glick & Emmert, supra note 
12, at 230; see also Crockett, supra note 55, at 441. 
56. “Among those who oppose merit selection, Judicial Nominating Commissions
have been characterized as secret elite cabals controlled by the trial Bar, without public 
accountability and favoring ‘liberal’ applicants.”  CAUFIELD, supra note 42, at 5.  Caufield’s
survey of members of judicial nominating commissions in 2011 found that the practices 
of their lawyer members were about evenly split between plaintiffs’ and defense work. Id.
at 15.  About a third of the commissioners who responded to the survey were women, and 
only about 11% identified themselves as non-whites.  Id. at 17; see supra note 53. 
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from large-firm, established business interests, mostly white and predominantly
male.57 
In response to these concerns, some states, by statute, rule, or informal
custom, have adopted practices that consciously promote diversity.58  Such
practices can have positive results, up to a point.  Based on a survey of ten 
merit-selection states, Esterling and Andersen found that independent
commissions nominate minority judicial candidates at a higher rate than
governors appoint minorities.59 Moreover, in the six states from which 
detailed data were available, Esterling et. al reported that commissions
nominated minority applicants at a higher rate than the applicant pool.60 
They found commissions nominated women and governors appointed women
in numbers roughly proportionate to their presence in the applicant pool.61 
The effects of judicial selection methods on gender, racial, and ethnic
diversity have been the subjects of considerable empirical research.  An 
early study concluded women and minorities represented a greater percentage
of state appellate and trial-court judges selected through appointment
systems—merit selection and otherwise—than through elections.62  Henry,
Koslow, Soffer, and Furey examined state appellate and trial-court judges 
together, and found that women represented 9.5% of judges selected through
merit, 9.3% of judges appointed outside of formal merit-selection protocols, 
and 6.4% of judges in election states.63  Henry et. al also reported that
 57. TORRES-SPELLISCY ET AL., supra note 13, at 8. 
58. ESTERLING & ANDERSEN, supra note 34, at 11–12.  For example, the Arizona 
constitution provides that nominating commissions “shall consider the diversity of the 
state’s population, however the primary consideration shall be merit.”  ARIZ. CONST. art.
VI, § 36.  Arizona’s uniform rules of procedure for nominating commissions state: “The 
goal . . . is to select judges who have outstanding professional competence and reputation
and who are also sensitive to the needs of and held in high esteem by the communities they
serve and who reflect, to the extent possible, the ethnic, racial and gender diversity of those
communities.” Uniform Rules of Procedure for Commissions on Appellate and Trial Court
Appointments, Rule 1, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17C (1993, current with amendments through
July 1, 2016); see TORRES-SPELLISCY ET AL., supra note 13, at 2 (urging that judicial nominating
commissions recruit more diverse applicants: “Expanding the pool of applicants at the start 
of the process is a key ingredient to ensuring a diverse ‘short list’ and ultimately a diverse 
bench.”); see also  BERRY, supra note 13; Leo M. Romero, Enhancing Diversity in an
Appointive System of Selecting Judges, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 485 (2007). 
59. ESTERLING & ANDERSEN, supra note 34, at 6.  They also found “that more diverse 
nominating commissions attract more diverse applicant pools and produce more diverse 
nominee lists.”  Id.
 60. Id. at 17–18.
 61. Id. at 17–19, 22, 28, Tables 5, 6, 9, 12. 
62. M.L. HENRY, JR. ET AL., FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, INC., THE SUCCESS OF WOMEN
AND MINORITIES IN ACHIEVING JUDICIAL OFFICE: THE SELECTION PROCESS 65 (1985). 
63. Id. at 18–20. 
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minorities represented 7.9% of judges selected through merit, 10.2% of
judges in appointment states, and 4.2% of judges in election states.64 
In the thirty years since that early research, however, the prevailing view
came to be that the particular selection system does not significantly affect
the rates at which women and minorities make their way to the appellate bench.
In 1996, for example, Alozie concluded that “women and minorities do equally
poorly across all systems.”65  Hurwitz and Lanier studied state high court 
and intermediate appellate judges at three points in time over the twenty 
years since 1985, a period over which women and non-whites made substantial 
advances onto appellate benches.66  They concluded that, for the most part,
“there are few significant differences in rates of diversity across the various
selection methods.”67  During each of the three periods they surveyed, 
“gubernatorial appointment,” meaning appointment by the governor in states 
without formal merit-selection protocols, was more likely to favor women 
and minorities, combined, than election or merit selection, although by 2005, 
the differences were narrow and not statistically significant.68  As Reddick,
Nelson, and Caufield concluded, “[N]either appointive nor elective methods 
were consistently more successful, or less successful, in diversifying state
judiciaries.”69
 64. Id.
 65. Alozie, supra note 54, at 112.  The same author earlier had observed that “[i]n
general, the data lead to the more fundamental observation that judicial selection methods
do not seem to be the major agents some analysts think they are.”  Nicholas O. Alozie,
Distribution of Women and Minority Judges: The Effects of Judicial Selection Methods, 
71 SOC. SCI. Q. 315, 318 (1990). 
66. Hurwitz & Lanier, supra note 12. 
67. Id. at 52.  They gathered racial and gender data for judges on courts of last resort 
and intermediate appellate courts for each of the 50 states, encompassing 1,310 judges on 
the bench as of June 30, 2005. Id. at 49–50; see also Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier,
Women and Minorities on State and Federal Appellate Benches, 1985 and 1999, 85 JUDICATURE
84, 85 (2001). 
68. Hurwitz & Lanier, supra note 12, at 55–56, fig.2.  Hurwitz and Lanier’s group
of “gubernatorial” appointment states included some, such as California, Maine, New Hampshire 
and New Jersey, in which panels of lawyers and non-lawyers forward prospective appointees
to their governors, but in which the governor is not legally bound to choose from among
the panel’s nominees. Id. at 56; see also infra Part II.B.5 (describing judicial selection methods
in those states).
69. MALIA REDDICK ET AL., AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, EXAMINING DIVERSITY OF STATE 
COURTS: HOW DOES THE JUDICIAL SELECTION ENVIRONMENT ADVANCE–AND INHIBIT–JUDICIAL
DIVERSITY? 7 (Apr. 1, 2009), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2731012 [https://perma.cc/RYW6­
HYMA].
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The 2005 data concerning members of state supreme courts and intermediate 
appellate courts, however, showed that merit selection advanced significantly
fewer women to the bench than other judicial selection methods.  By contrast,
“appointment” states, those without formal merit-selection protocols, produced 
a statistically significantly greater percentage of female judges.70  Reddick et. 
al, concluded that the method of selection did not affect the gender composition 
of state courts of last resort, but that, taking into account the relevant political
environments, “merit selection placed significantly fewer women on 
intermediate appellate courts than did partisan or nonpartisan elections.”71 
Beyond gender, race, and ethnicity, far less empirical research has focused 
on career paths and other attributes of appellate judges selected by the
various methods.  Studying members of state courts of last resort between
1961 and 1968, Canon found that more than half of all elected and merit-
selected judges were former prosecutors, while fewer of what he called
“appointed” judges and judges selected by legislatures had served as
prosecutors.72  On the other hand, more appointed judges and judges selected 
by the legislature had prior judicial experience than elected and merit-
selected judges.73 
Glick and Emmert studied members of state courts of last resort in
1980–81 and found that partisan election and legislative selection chose
proportionately fewer former prosecutors than other selection methods.74 
They found that judges selected by legislatures were most likely to have
prior judicial experience.75  Studying other aspects of the judges’ career paths, 
70. Hurwitz & Lanier, supra note 12, at 53 tbl.2.  Hurwitz and Lanier also found,
however, that merit selection advanced black judges at a greater rate than “gubernatorial 
appointment.” Id.  By contrast, black men fared about equally well in election states as in
merit-selection states, although states that elected their judges chose a statistically significantly
larger proportion of black female judges than were selected in “appointment” states, whether 
merit selection or otherwise.  Merit-selection systems produced Hispanic male judges at
more than double the rate in election states, but there were too few Hispanic women in the 
2005 data set for any real quantitative analysis.  Id.
 71. REDDICK ET AL., supra note 69, at 4, 6.  They reported that, although 37.6% of all
intermediate appellate court judges were selected by merit, only 27.5% of female judges 
reached the intermediate appellate court via merit selection. Id. at 4. 
72. Bradley C. Canon, The Impact of Formal Selection Processes on the Characteristics 
of Judges–Reconsidered, 6 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 579, 589 tbl.1 (1972). 
73. Id.
74. Glick & Emmert, supra note 12, at 232 tbl.1. Judges elected in non-partisan
elections were most likely to have prosecutorial experience, followed by merit-selected
judges, judges selected by gubernatorial appointment, judges elected in partisan elections 
and judges selected by legislature. Id. A study conducted in 1999 found that 28.3% of 
state supreme court justices in 1999 had been a prosecutor at some time in their careers.
Martin & Pyle, supra note 12, at 42 tbl.2.  Prosecutorial work was a more frequent career
path for non-white female justices at 40%, but less likely for white women at 22.4%. Id.
 75. Glick & Emmert, supra note 12, at 232 tbl.1.  Nearly 79% of the judges selected
by the legislature had served on another bench.  Judges selected by way of partisan election, 
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they reported that 78.6% of judges selected by the legislature themselves had
been legislators.76  On the other hand, judges with prior legislative service
represented no more than 21% of the benches chosen by any of the other 
selection methods.77  In their study of supreme court elections from 1990 
to 2004, Bonneau and Hall found evidence that voters seem to prefer
candidates who have prior judicial experience.78 
Researchers also have considered “localism,” as demonstrated by attendance 
at in-state law schools or undergraduate institutions.  Canon found that, of 
state supreme court judges sitting between 1961 and 1968, those chosen 
by partisan elections or by the legislature were most likely to have attended
in-state undergraduate schools or law schools.79  Appointed judges were least 
likely to have attended in-state law schools.80  Similarly, Glick et. al observed 
that among members of state courts of last resort in 1980–81, judges 
selected by gubernatorial appointment were least likely to have attended 
in-state academic institutions.81  Studying members of state courts of last 
resort in 1998–2000, Choi et. al likewise found that judges in election states 
were more likely to have attended an in-state law school.82 
Finally, focusing on one possible objective measure of intellect, Glick
et. al also found that while half of judges on state high courts in gubernatorial 
appointment states in 1980–81 went to prestigious law schools, other selection 
methods chose far fewer graduates of such institutions.83 Similarly, Choi et. 
al found that appointed judges on state high courts during 1998–2000 were 
significantly more likely to have attended a higher-ranked law school than 
judges in election states.84 
gubernatorial appointment, and merit selection all boasted prior judicial experience in the 
mid-60% range; slightly fewer of the judges in non-partisan election states had prior judicial 
experience. Id.
76. When this Article cites the numerical results of others’ research, it uses the numbers
provided in their published findings.  By contrast, this Article usually will round the numerical 
findings of this study to the nearest whole number for ease of reading.  The tables herein
describe the results more precisely.
77.  Glick & Emmert, supra note 12, at 223 tbl.1. 
78. BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 5, at 97–98. 
79. Canon, supra note 72, at 581. 
80. Id. at 589 tbl.1.
81.  Glick & Emmert, supra note 12, at 232 tbl.1. 
82.  Choi et al., supra note 48, at 327. 
 83. Glick & Emmert, supra note 12, at 232 tbl.1. Similarly, more gubernatorial-appointed 
judges attended “prestigious” undergraduate institutions.  Id. 
84.  Choi et al., supra note 48, at 327. 
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II. A CLOSE LOOK AT STATE APPELLATE JUDGES ON 

THE BENCH IN 2015 

A. The Hypothesis: The Various Selection Methods, and Merit        

Selection in Particular, Produce Appellate Benches         

with Some Distinct Differences
 
Prior studies of judicial selection methods mostly focused on gender, racial, 
and ethnic diversity; a handful of early studies discussed the extent to which 
various selection systems welcome former prosecutors and experienced
judges; and a few studies looked at localism factors.  The goal of this study
was to take a closer look at broader data relating to the judges sitting on state
appellate courts in 2015.  Appellate benches by nature are a mix of all varieties 
of temperament, experience, backgrounds, intellect, style, and expertise.  The
question is whether any of the various selection methods tend to produce a
mix of those attributes that is significantly different from the others. The
hypothesis was that, in particular, merit selection results in appellate benches 
different in nature from benches chosen by popular election.  Perhaps judges
selected by merit are more likely to be scholarly and more likely to come
from commercial law firms that tend to hire from prestigious law schools.
Merit selection may be more likely to favor that sort of lawyer, or perhaps
that sort of lawyer is more likely to seek appointment through merit selection
than to run for office. It also might be that, by contrast, election systems are
more favorable for former prosecutors and lawyers with strong local ties, who 
might be more predisposed to enjoy the rough-and-tumble of campaigning 
and campaign fund-raising.
Another issue is whether merit selection tends to disadvantage women 
and minorities who seek state appellate benches.  Considering the frequent 
criticism that merit selection unfairly favors elitist and establishment judicial
aspirants, it is possible that a close look at the characteristics of the judges 
chosen by merit selection, compared to those chosen by other selection
methods, might shed light on the validity of those criticisms. 
To test these hypotheses, a wide range of information was gathered about 
judges on the bench in February 2015 on courts of last resort and intermediate
appellate courts in all fifty states, including the state criminal appeals courts in 
Oklahoma and Texas.  For each of the 1,285 judges in the set, the data
included the judge’s age at the time he or she was selected to the bench, and 
his or her gender, race, and ethnicity.  Information also was gathered about 
the judges’ educational backgrounds.  Those who had served judicial clerkships 
were noted, as were those who had been elected to the American Law Institute 
or who had published law review articles before coming to the bench.
Those who have taught at a college or university were identified, along with
those with prior service on another trial or appellate bench and those who 
846
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had been in private practice and had practiced business law, commercial 
law, or complex commercial litigation before coming to the bench.  Judges
who had served as prosecutors at some point in their careers were
identified; included in this group not only were those who had served as 
an elected District Attorney, County Attorney, or state Attorney General, but
also those who were line prosecutors in such offices.  In addition, judges who
had practiced in other government-law capacities, for example, those who
represented government agencies in civil litigation, were identified, as
well as judges who had practiced in legal-aid or public-defender offices before
coming to the bench.85 
B. Categorizing the Selection Methods
The research produced more than two dozen data points with respect to 
each judge, which then were sorted according to the states’ respective judicial
selection methods.86  Prior studies comparing the effects of various judicial
selection methods have not stated plainly how and why they have categorized 
each of the states. The results of this study must be considered in light of
those initial classification decisions, which are briefly described below. 
1. Partisan Election 
Voters in eight states—Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia—elected their appellate judges in
partisan elections at the time of this study.87 Ohio is in this category because, 
85. The sources of the data gathered for this study were wide and varied. Great reliance
was placed on official court websites, but much information also was obtained from the website 
Ballotpedia, formerly known as Judgepedia, gubernatorial press releases, candidate websites, 
law school and university publications, Westlaw, and online versions of local newspapers. 
See BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Main_Page [https://perma.cc/84TG-7D7R] (last
visited Nov. 14, 2016); see, e.g., ARIZ. COURTS, http://www.azcourts.gov/ [https://perma.cc/
KU8T-35FS] (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
 86. As discussed infra Part III.C.2, a considerable number of appellate judges in “election”
states actually come to the bench for the first time by appointment.  The data allow for distinctions
between the two groups. 
87. This method is codified in each state’s constitution, and some states list additional
procedures elsewhere: Alabama (ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 152; ALA. CODE § 12-2-1 (LexisNexis
1975)); Illinois (ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12(a)); Louisiana (LA. CONST. art. V, § 22(A); LA.
STAT. ANN. § 18:401 (2004)); New Mexico (N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 33(A)); Ohio (OHIO 
CONST. art. IV, § 6(A); see infra note 88 (exploring Ohio’s election laws)); Pennsylvania
(PA. CONST. art. V, § 13(a); 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2872.1(8)–(10) (West
2007)); Texas (TEX. CONST. art. 5, §§ 2(c), 4(a), 6(b); TEX. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon
 847










        
 
         
   
 
 
   




    
 
  








   
 
  
   
     
    
   
 
       
   
  
even though its judicial candidates run in ostensibly non-partisan general 
elections, candidates are nominated in partisan primary elections and there
is substantial evidence that partisanship predominates in the general election.88 
Even in these partisan-election states, however, many appellate judges
initially come to the bench by appointment, not election.  In six of the states, 
the governor has the power to appoint a judge to fill a mid-term vacancy that 
occurs upon the death, resignation, retirement, or removal of an incumbent.89 
In two of those six, the governor may select the new judge from a list of 
nominees prepared by an independent judicial nominating commission.90 
In the remaining two partisan-election states, mid-term vacancies on appellate 
5(2)); and West Virginia (W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 2).  (Beginning in 2016, judicial elections
in West Virginia are non-partisan. W. Va. Code Ann. § 3-1-16 (2016)). 
88. Ohio’s judicial election system has been called “nonpartisan in form but partisan in
results.”  Kathleen L. Barber, Ohio Judicial Elections–Nonpartisan Premises with Partisan 
Results, 32 OHIO ST.L.J. 762, 770 (1971); see also Nancy Marion, Rick Farmer & Todd Moore,
Financing Ohio Supreme Court Elections 1992-2002: Campaign Finance and Judicial 
Selection, 38 AKRON L. REV. 567, 573 (2005) (“The semi-partisan method employed in 
Ohio is known for producing partisan campaigning.”).  In the so-called non-partisan general 
election campaign, an Ohio judicial candidate may “[a]ppear with other candidates for public 
office on slate cards, sample ballots, and other publications of a political party that identify
all of the candidates endorsed by the party in an election.” OHIO CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, 
R. 4.2(C)(4).  Further, a judicial candidate’s campaign may accept large sums in donations 
from political parties in the general election.  Contribution limits are adjusted every four 
years in accordance with the Consumer Price Index; as of 2013, a political party could donate 
up to $333,000 to the campaign of a supreme court candidate for the general election and
$72,700 to the general election of a court of appeals candidate.  SUPREME COURT OF OHIO JUD.
C., 2016 JUDICIAL CANDIDATE HANDBOOK 13, https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Judiciary/
candidates/handbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KKA-45HX] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016).  As a 
result, even though judicial candidates appear on the general election ballot without party
designation, voters are well aware of candidates’ respective party affiliations.  Cann, supra note 
40, at 228. 
89. ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 153 (appointee serves until the next general election after 
completion of a year in office); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 35 (once appointed, new judge 
serves until next general election); OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 13 (appointee serves until first 
general election occurring more than forty days after the vacancy occurred, or, if the unexpired
term ends within a year immediately following the date of such election, the appointment 
is for the unexpired term); PA. CONST. art. V, § 13(b) (when governor fills vacancy by
appointment, new judge must be confirmed by vote of two-thirds of state senate; new judge 
serves until next election more than ten months after the vacancy occurred or for the remainder
of the unexpired term, whichever period is shorter); TEX. CONST. art. V, § 28(a); W. VA.
CONST. art. VIII, § 7; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-10-3a (LexisNexis 2008) (governor fills vacancy
on supreme court of appeals by appointment pending special election or, if less than two years
remains on unexpired term, until expiration of term); see also White v. Sturns, 651 S.W.2d 
372, 374–76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983) (holding that appointment requires senate confirmation
and appointee serves until the next state general election). 
90. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 35 (allowing governor to appoint new judge from applicants
recommended by appellate judges nominating commission); W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 7; 
W. VA. CODE § 3-10-3a (allowing governor to make appointment after receiving a list of 
qualified candidates from Judicial Vacancy Advisory Commission). 
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courts are filled by the supreme court.91  Once appointed to fill an interim
vacancy, the new judge in a partisan-election state may run as an incumbent
in a subsequent election.
Five partisan-election states require that a judge who wants to remain in 
office after the end of a term must run again in another partisan election.92 
In three other states, having won election and having completed a full term 
in office, an incumbent judge may remain on the bench by surviving an
up-or-down retention election without an opponent.93 
2. Non-Partisan Election
In fourteen states at the time of this study—Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, 
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin—voters elected
members of the appellate bench in non-partisan elections.94 Mid-term
 91. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12(c) (allowing appointee named more than sixty
days before next general or judicial election to serve until election; appointee named less than
sixty days before next primary election serves until the second general or judicial election
following appointment); LA. CONST. art. V, § 22 (allowing appointee to sit pending special 
election; appointee may not run in special election). 
92. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 152; LA. CONST. art. V, § 22; OHIO CONST. art. IV, 
§ 6(A); TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 2(c), 4(a), 6(b); W.VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
93. ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 10, 12(d) (requiring affirmative vote of three-fifths of
those voting for retention); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 33(A) (requiring completion of initial 
eight-year term in office, and at least 57% of vote cast for retention); PA. CONST. art. V, 
§ 15 (b) (requiring completion of ten-year term and majority vote for retention).
94. For the nuances in each state’s procedures, see Arkansas (ARK. CONST. amend. 
80, § 18(A)); Georgia (GA. CONST. art. VI, § 7, ¶ 1); Idaho (IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 6; IDAHO 
CODE §§ 34-117, -615, -1217 (2015) (election of justices to the supreme court); IDAHO
CODE § 1-2404(4)(f) (2010) (election of justices to the court of appeals)); Kentucky (KY.
CONST. § 117); Michigan (MICH. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 8; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 168.392, 
-.393, -.409a (West 2008) (supreme court justices nominated in partisan fashion but 
candidates run without party designation in general election; court of appeals judges both
nominated and run in non-partisan elections)); Minnesota (MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 7; MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 204D.14, 480A.02 (West 1992)); Mississippi (MISS. CONST. art. VI, § 145; 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-4-15 (West 1999) (election of members of court of appeals); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 23-15-976 (West 2003)); Montana MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 8; MONT. CODE
ANN. § 13-14-111 (2015)); Nevada (NEV. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3, 3A(2)); North Carolina (N.C.
CONST. art. IV, § 16; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-322 (2009)); North Dakota (N.D. CONST. art. VI,
§ 7); Oregon (OR. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (amended); OR. REV. STAT. § 254.125(2) (2015));
Washington (WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 3; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 2.06.070 (West 2004)); 
and Wisconsin (WIS. CONST. art. VII, §§ 4(1), 5(2), 9; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 5.60(1) (West 2004)). 
As stated supra note 87, in 2016, West Virginia joined the ranks of states that elect their appellate 
judges in non-partisan elections. For purposes of this study, which analyzed data about 
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judicial vacancies in non-partisan states are filled by gubernatorial
appointment.95  As in partisan-election states, in a handful of non-partisan
election states, when a mid-term vacancy occurs, an independent commission 
forwards nominations for the governor’s consideration.96 
judges on the bench as of 2015, however, this Articles treats West Virginia as a partisan-
election state.
95. Details of how vacancies are filled vary from state to state: Arkansas (ARK.
CONST. amend. 80, § 18(B)); Georgia (GA. CONST. art. VI, § 7, ¶ III; id. ¶ IV (“An
appointee to an elective office shall serve until a successor is duly selected and qualified 
and until January 1 of the year following the next general election which is more than six 
months after such person’s appointment.”)); Idaho (IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 19; IDAHO 
CODE § 1-2102(3) (2010) (allowing appointee to serve until general election following one
year in office); IDAHO CODE §§ 2404(4)(b), (f) (2010) (allowing court of appeals vacancies to
be filled in same manner as supreme court vacancies; appointee runs in election next preceding
the expiration of the appointed term)); Kentucky (KY. CONST. § 118 (allowing chief justice 
to appoint if governor does not make appointment within sixty days)); Michigan (MICH.
CONST. art. VI, § 23 (allowing appointee to hold office until the next January after a general
election); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 168.404, -.409l(l)(1) (West 2014)); Minnesota (MINN.
CONST. art. VI, § 8 (appointee holds office until next general election more than one year after
appointment)); Mississippi (MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 9-1-103, 23-15-849 (West 2003)
(allowing appointee to serve remaining unexpired term if less than half a term; however, 
if more than half a term remains, appointee serves until general election more than nine
months after vacancy occurred)); Montana (MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 8(2); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 3-1-1010, -1011 (West 2015) (governor appoints replacement from a list of nominees,
subject to confirmation by state senate)); Nevada (NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 20 (allowing 
appointee to sit until next general election)); North Carolina (N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 19
(allowing appointee to sit until next election held more than sixty days after vacancy
occurred)); North Dakota (N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 13; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 27-25-04 
(West 2006) (allowing governor to appoint a replacement or call a special election; appointee
serves until next general election more than two years after appointment)); Oregon (OR. CONST. 
art. V, § 16 (allowing appointee to serve until after next election more than sixty-one days
after appointment)); Washington (WASH.CONST. art. 4, § 3; WASH.REV.CODE ANN. § 2.06.080
(West 2004) (allowing appointee to sit until next general election)); and Wisconsin (WIS.
CONST. art. VII, § 9 (allowing appointee to sit until next judicial election). 
96.  By executive order in Georgia, a Judicial Nominating Commission vets candidates
and nominates potential appointees, but the governor is not required to appoint from among the
nominees. Ga. Exec. Order No. 02.02.15.01 (Feb. 2, 2015), http://gov.georgia.gov/sites/gov.
georgia.gov/files/related_files/document/02.02.15.01.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JWF-RK9P].
In Idaho, the governor is allowed to make appointments from nominees submitted by such
a commission.  IDAHO CONST. art. V, § 19; IDAHO CODE § 1-2102(3); IDAHO CODE § 1­
2404(4)(b) (filling vacancies on court of appeals in same manner as vacancies on supreme
court). Kentucky follows a similar procedure.  KY. CONST. § 118 (allowing governor to make
appointment from nominees selected by judicial nominating commission); MONT. CONST. art.
VII, § 8(2).  In Montana, the governor is required to make appointments from nominees 
selected by a commission.  MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 3-1-1010, -1011 (2015).  The same is true
in Nevada. NEV. CONST. art. VI, § 20 (requiring governor to make appointment from
nominees selected by Commission on Judicial Selection). In North Dakota, the governor 
has more options.  N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 13; N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-25-03, -04 (2016) 
(allowing governor to appoint replacement from among nominees submitted by judicial
nominating committee, “[r]eturn the list of nominees and direct the committee to reconvene,”
or call special election to fill vacancy).
850
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A judge who wins election and completes a full term in a non-partisan
election state usually must run in another non-partisan election to remain
in office.97 
3. Legislative Selection 
Two states, South Carolina and Virginia, leave the selection of their appellate
judges to the legislature.  In South Carolina, the bicameral General Assembly 
elects members of the state supreme court and court of appeals from nominees
forwarded by the Judicial Merit Selection Commission.98  If a vacancy occurs
with less than a year remaining in the term, the governor may appoint 
a replacement, who holds office only through the unexpired term.99  In 
Virginia, the two houses of the General Assembly elect members of the
supreme court and the court of appeals; if a vacancy occurs while the General
Assembly is not in session, the governor may appoint a successor to serve
until thirty days after the beginning of the next legislative session.100 
4. Merit Selection 
Twelve states—Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, 
Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee and Wyoming— 
use the classic version of merit selection to select their appellate judges.101 
In those states, there is an appointed independent bipartisan commission,
97. For more detail regarding the precise form of these elections, see Arkansas (ARK.
CONST. amend. 80, § 18(A)); Georgia (GA. CONST. art. VI, § 7, ¶ 1); Idaho (IDAHO CONST. 
art. V, § 6; IDAHO CODE § 34-615(1); § 1-2404(4)(b)); Kentucky (KY. CONST. § 117); Michigan
(MICH. COMP. LAWS 168.392a, -399, -409e(3)); Minnesota (MINN. CONST. art. VI, § 7);
Mississippi (MISS. CONST. art. VI, § 145; MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-4-15); Montana (MONT.
CONST. art. VII, § 8(3) (allowing voters to “approve or reject” an incumbent if no candidate 
files to run against the incumbent)); Nevada (NEV. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3, 3A(2)); North Carolina 
(N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16.  But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-4.1 (requiring an elected supreme
court justice who has completed full term and who wishes to remain on bench to sit for
up-or-down retention, effective June 2015)); North Dakota (N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 7);
Oregon (OR. CONST. art. VII, § 1); Washington (WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 3; WASH. REV. CODE
§ 2.06.070); and Wisconsin (WIS. CONST. art. VII, §§ 4(1), 5(2), 9). 
98. S.C. CONST. art. V, §§ 3, 8, 27. 
99. Id. § 18. 
100. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
101.  In 2016, the Tennessee Code was amended to provide that future gubernatorial 
appointments to the appellate bench will require approval of a majority of both the state senate
and the state house of representatives. TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-102 (2016); see also infra 
note 117. 
 851














         
  
    
   





     
    




       
     
     
     
    
   
  
    
   
        
     
 
      
  
     
 
 
   
   
    
made up of both lawyers and non-lawyers, which screens applications, vets 
and interviews the applicants, and then delivers a list of nominees to the
governor for appointment.102  In nearly all merit-selection states, the governor 
is obligated to appoint one of the nominees of the independent commission.103 
In Florida and Tennessee, when the governor is dissatisfied with the nominees,
he or she may direct the commission to submit another list of nominees.104 
In most of the other merit-selection states, the governor’s choices are limited
to the commission’s initial list.105 
In each merit-selection state, an appellate judge stands for retention in an
up-or-down election at some point after appointment, and at regular intervals
thereafter.106  In a retention election, the judge faces no opponent; voters are
102. For more detail, see Alaska (ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 5, 6); Arizona (ARIZ.
CONST. art. VI, §§ 36, 37); Colorado (COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 20(1)); Florida (FLA. CONST. 
art. V, § 11; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 43.291 (West 2012)); Indiana (IND. CONST. art. VII, §§ 9,
10); Iowa (IOWA CONST. art. V, §§ 15, 16; IOWA CODE §§ 46.1–4, 46.14–15 (2016)); Missouri 
(MO. CONST. art. V, §§ 25(a), 25(d)); Nebraska (NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21); Oklahoma (OKLA.
CONST. art. VII-B, §§ 3, 4); South Dakota (S.D. CONST. art. V, § 7); Tennessee (TENN.
CONST. art. VI, § 3; TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-101 (2016); Tenn. Exec. Order No. 41 (Nov. 
6, 2014), http://share.tn.gov/sos/pub/execorders/exec-orders-haslam41.pdf [https://perma.cc/
44SH-64EB]); and Wyoming (WYO. CONST. art. 5, § 4(b)–(c)).
103. ESTERLING & ANDERSEN, supra note 34, at 11; Flango & Ducat, supra note 47, at
26. 
104. See Florida (FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11(a); FLA. STAT. § 43.291(1)(a) (2016)); and
Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-101 (2016); Tenn. Exec. Order No. 41, para. 5(b) (Nov.
6, 2014), http://share.tn.gov/sos/pub/execorders/exec-orders-haslam41.pdf [https://perma.cc/
44SH-64EB]).
105. In Arizona, if the governor fails to appoint one of the commission’s nominees 
within sixty days, the power to fill the judicial vacancy falls to the Chief Justice of the state
supreme court.  ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 37(C).  Similar rules apply in: Colorado (COLO.CONST. 
art. VI, § 20(1) (allowing governor fifteen days to make appointment)); Indiana (IND. CONST. art.
7, § 10  (allowing governor sixty days before appointment by chief justice)); Iowa (IOWA
CONST. art. V, § 15 (allowing governor thirty days before appointment by chief justice);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 46.15(2) (same)); Missouri (MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(a) (allowing governor
sixty days, otherwise the judicial nominating commission appoints)); Nebraska (NEB. CONST. 
art. V, § 21(1) (allowing governor sixty days)); Oklahoma (OKLA. CONST. art. VII-B § 4 
(allowing governor sixty days before appointment by chief justice)); and Wyoming (WYO.
CONST. art. 5, § 4(b) (allowing governor thirty days before appointment by chief justice)).
106. For precise retention timeframes, see Alaska (ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 6 (requiring
justices to stand for retention in the first general election held after completion of three
years in office and, thereafter, every ten years)); Arizona (ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4, 37(C), 38
(judge must stand for retention at first election after two years in office; every six years 
thereafter)); Colorado (COLO. CONST. art. VI, §§ 7, 20, 25; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4­
104 (must stand for retention at first election after two years in office; every ten years 
thereafter for supreme court justice; eight years for court of appeals judge)); Florida (FLA.
CONST. art. V, §§ 10, 11 (requiring retention election after one year in office and thereafter,
every six years)); Indiana (IND. CONST. art. 7, § 11 (requiring retention election after two years 
in office, and thereafter every ten years)); Iowa (IOWA CONST. art. V, § 17 (requiring retention
election after one year in office, and thereafter every eight years)); Missouri (MO. CONST. 
art. V, §§ 19, 25(c)(1) (next general election after one year in office, and thereafter every 
852
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asked simply whether to retain the judge in office, and to prevail, the judge 
must win more than a designated percentage of votes. 
In addition to the dozen states already listed, Kansas is treated as a merit- 
selection state for purposes of this study.  In 2013, the Kansas legislature 
passed and the governor signed into law a measure abandoning use of an 
independent nominating commission for court of appeals judges.107  All 
but one of the judges sitting on the Kansas intermediate appellate court in 
February 2015, however, were appointed under the prior Missouri Plan
system.
California also is treated as a merit-selection state even though it uses a
variant of the traditional merit system.  Since 1979, applicants for the bench
in California are reviewed and rated by an independent commission created 
by statute and made up of lawyers and non-lawyers appointed by the California 
State Bar Association.108  Called the “Commission on Judicial Nominees 
Evaluation,” that body reports in confidence to the governor whether an
applicant is exceptionally well qualified, well qualified, qualified, or not
qualified, and the reasons therefor.109  Although the commission’s ratings do 
not formally constrain the governor’s appointment prerogative, over the 
twelve years)); Nebraska (NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21(3) (requiring retention election after three
years; every six years thereafter)); Oklahoma (OKLA. CONST. art. VII-B, § 5; OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 20, § 30.18 (2016) (requiring retention election after twelve months; every six years
thereafter)); South Dakota (S.D. CONST. art. V, § 7 (requiring retention election after three 
years; every eight years thereafter)); Tennessee (TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-105 (2016) (judge
must stand for retention at first election more than thirty days after vacancy occurred; every 
eight years thereafter)); and Wyoming (WYO. CONST. art. 5, § 4(f)–(g) (judge must stand
for retention at first election more than one year after appointment; every eight years
thereafter)).  Kansas also follows this convention. KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 5(c) (judge must stand 
for retention at first election after one year in office, and thereafter every six years). 
107. KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 5. But see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-3020 (2015).  Under the 
new procedure, although the governor is unconstrained by a nominating commission in filling 
vacancies on the court of appeals, the appointee must be confirmed by a majority of the state 
senate.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-3020(b).  Notwithstanding the change in the method by which
it chooses its intermediate appellate court judges, Kansas continues to use a Missouri Plan 
approach for its supreme court.  See KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 5.  In that process, the governor
must select a new supreme court justice from a list of nominees submitted by the supreme
court nominating commission.  Id. § 5(a).  If the governor does not make the appointment 
within sixty days, the chief justice may do so. Id. § 5(b).  A justice sits for retention at the 
first general election held following twelve months in office, and at the completion of every
six-year term thereafter. Id. § 5(c).
108. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12011.5 (West 2016).  The commission must contain both
lawyer and non-lawyer members and must be “broadly representative of the ethnic, gender, and
racial diversity of the population of California[.]” Id. § 12011.5(b).
109. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12011.5(c). 
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years, the governor has appointed only a couple of appellate judges whom 
the commission found not qualified.110  After the governor has made his or
her selection, the appointee must be confirmed by the Commission on
Judicial Appointments, a body made up of the Chief Justice, the Attorney
General, and the senior presiding justice of the Court of Appeal.111 Given 
its makeup, the Commission on Judicial Appointments seems unlikely to
refuse to confirm any appointment by the governor.112  Therefore, because 
the California Commission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation serves as
a functional constraint on the governor’s power to fill a judicial vacancy, 
and the Commission on Judicial Appointments seems less of a functional 
constraint, this study treats California as a merit-selection state, rather than 
a “merit-confirmation” state. 
Finally, members of New York’s intermediate appellate court, but not
the members of its highest court, are selected through a variation of the
Missouri Plan.113  New York’s general jurisdiction trial court is called the
Supreme Court, and its intermediate appellate court is called the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court.  Under the state constitution, the governor
appoints members of the Appellate Division from among the current justices
on the supreme court.114 For many years, a Departmental Judicial Screening 
Committee, created by gubernatorial executive order, has evaluated and
recommended candidates for all judicial positions in the Appellate Division.115
 110. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16.  If the governor appoints an applicant the commission has 
rated “not qualified,” the State Bar may disclose the unfavorable rating. CAL. GOV’T CODE
§ 12011.5(g). As a practical matter, that “threat of adverse publicity” has effectively constrained 
California governors from appointing applicants rated as not qualified. See, e.g., Tina Bay, San 
Bernardino Judge Chosen Despite Low JNE Rating, METROPOLITAN NEWS ENTERPRISE, 
July 24, 2007, at 1, http://www.metnews.com/articles/2007/piro072407.htm [https://perma.cc/
ZF44-ETHW]; Roger M. Grace, San Bernardino Bench Has Its Version of ‘Bagel Lady’– 
the ‘Real Estate Guy,’  METROPOLITAN NEWS ENTERPRISE, July 24, 2007, at 7; Board
Approves Stricter JNE Rules, CAL. BAR JOURNAL (Dec. 2010), http://www.calbarjournal.com/
December2010/Top Headlines/TH5.aspx [https://perma.cc/JUN6-2HYR].
111. CAL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 7, 16(d)(2). 
112. The Commission on Judicial Appointments holds a public hearing, at which it 
receives written and oral comments concerning the judicial nominee. Guidelines for the 
Commission on Judicial Appointments, CAL. COMM’N JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 5 (Nov. 19,
2007), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/guidelinescja.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2H3-CY5J ].
The commission’s role has been described as “more of a matter of form than substance,” and 
its hearings described as “often more a pleasant public ceremony than a rigorous and contested 
examination of qualifications.”  John L. Dodd et al., The Case for Judicial Appointments, 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Jan. 1, 2003), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/the-case-for- 
judicial-appointments [https://perma.cc/DGM9-L9YA].
113. See discussion of New York’s Court of Appeals, infra note 137. 
114. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 4(c).  Members of the supreme court are elected to fourteen- 
year terms in partisan elections, by district. Id. § 6(c). 
115. See, e.g., N.Y.C. BAR COUNCIL JUDICIAL ADMIN., JUDICIAL SELECTION METHODS IN
THE STATE OF NEW YORK: A GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING AND GETTING INVOLVED IN THE
854
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Under the executive orders, the governor only may appoint justices to the 
Appellate Division that the judicial screening committee has found to be
“highly qualified” or “well qualified.”116 Therefore, because each justice
sitting on the Appellate Division in February 2015 was appointed by the governor
from a list of candidates recommended by a screening committee, the members 
of that court are treated as merit-selected. 
5. “Merit-Confirmation”
In the remaining eleven states—Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Utah, 
and Vermont, and for New York’s Court of Appeals—the governor appoints 
appellate judges subject to the approval of another elected body.117  Earlier
studies tended to label as “merit selection” any state that employed strict 
merit-selection protocols and label as simply “appointment” any other state
whose governor was empowered to fill appellate judicial vacancies by
appointment.118  In characterizing the latter group as “appointment” states 
without further explanation, however, the prior literature does not acknowledge 
two significant constraints on the governor’s appointment power in those 
states.
SELECTION PROCESS (2014), http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072672-Guideto
JudicialSelectionMethodsinNewYork.pdf [https://perma.cc/SU46-U97T].
116. Id. at 34; N.Y. Exec. Order No. 9, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 4.9 
(1983); N.Y. Exec. Order No. 4, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 6.4 (2007); N.Y. 
Exec. Order No. 10, N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 5.10 (1995). 
117. Appointments to the appellate bench in Tennessee after January 28, 2016 will require
confirmation by the state senate and the state house of representatives.  TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 17-4-102 (LEXIS through 2016 Sess.). This Article will treat Tennessee as a merit-selection 
state—not a merit-confirmation state—because each Tennessee judge in the 2015 data set 
was appointed under the prior statutory procedure. 
118. For example, in their 2003 study, Hurwitz et al. distinguished between judges 
in “merit system” states and those in “elite nomination” states, the latter category being those
in which judges are appointed by the governor or the legislature.  Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew 
Noble Lanier, Explaining Judicial Diversity: The Differential Ability of Women and Minorities 
to Attain Seats on State Supreme and Appellate Courts, 3 STATE POL. & POL’Y Q. 329, 335
(2003). In other studies, the same researchers grouped judges selected by “merit selection”
separately from “legislative appointment” and “gubernatorial appointment.”  Hurwitz & 
Lanier, supra note 67, at 86.  In their comprehensive 2008 report, they classified non-elected
state judges as being “nominated by commission” or as the product of “gubernatorial
appointment” or “legislative election.”  Hurwitz & Lanier, supra note 12, at 51.  Reddick 
et al., distinguished judges chosen by “gubernatorial appointment” from those chosen by merit 
selection, and also broke out a small number of judges selected by “court appointment.” 
REDDICK ET AL., supra note 69, at 3. 
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The first constraint is that, in each of the eleven states, a judicial nominating 
commission must screen applicants before the governor may make the
appointment.  In five of the states, the judicial nominating commission is 
created by the state constitution, just as in traditional merit-selection states.119 
In the remaining six states, judicial nominating commissions have been
created by a series of long-standing executive orders.120 
The second constraint is that, in each of the eleven states and for 
appointments to New York’s Court of Appeals, the governor’s appointee may
not take the bench before being confirmed by a separately elected body.
Although the prior literature studying state judicial selection methods has 
not assessed how a confirmation requirement may constrain the gubernatorial 
appointment prerogative, the constitutional requirement that the United
States Senate must give its “advice and consent” to any judicial nomination 
has significantly restrained the President’s power to appoint members of the
federal bench. Through 2011, the Senate failed to confirm 36 of 160
presidential nominations to the United States Supreme Court.121  Researchers
have observed that the Senate has taken it upon itself more frequently over 
the past few decades to review not only a judicial nominee’s professional 
119. See CONN. CONST. art. V, § 2; id. amends. XX, XXV; HAW. CONST. art. VI, § 3; R.I.
CONST. art. X, § 4; UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 8; VT. CONST. ch. II, § 32.
120. Those states are: Delaware (DEL.CONST. art IV, § 3; Del. Exec. Order No. 4, 12 Del.
Reg. Regs. 1439 (May 1, 2009)); Maine (ME. CONST. art. V, § 8; Me. Exec. Order No. 9 FY
94/95 (Feb. 10, 1995); Me. Exec. Order No. 3, 291 Me. Gov’t Reg. 1 (Apr. 2015) (referencing
and reaffirming Executive Order No. 9 FY 94/95, which established the Governor’s Committee 
on Judicial Appointments); see also NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, Methods of Judicial 
Selection: Maine, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_
judges.cfm?state=ME [https://perma.cc/4M6X-WCKG] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016) [hereinafter 
Methods of Judicial Selection: Maine]); Maryland (MD. CONST. art. IV, § 5A; Md. Exec.
Order No. 01.01.2015.09, 42 Md. Reg. 416 (Feb. 20, 2015)); Massachusetts (MASS. CONST. 
ch. II, § 1, art. IX; Mass. Exec. Order No. 558, 1281 Mass. Reg. 1 (Feb. 27, 2015); Mass. 
Exec. Order No. 500, 1101 Mass. Reg. 9 (Apr. 4, 2008); Mass. Exec. Order No. 470, 1046
Mass. Reg. 3 (Feb. 24, 2006)); New Hampshire (N.H. CONST. art. 46, art. 60; N.H. Exec.
Order No. 2013-06, 33 N.H. Rulemaking Reg. 19 (May 9, 2013); see also NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS, Methods of Judicial Selection: New Hampshire, http://www.judicialselection.
us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state=NH [https://perma.cc/3JLQ­
8D73] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Methods of Judicial Selection: New Hampshire]);
and New Jersey (N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, ¶ 1, § 3, ¶ 3 & § 7, ¶ 2; N.J. Exec. Order No. 36, 
38 N.J. Reg. 4525(b) (Nov. 6, 2006); N.J. Exec. Order No. 32, 42 N.J. Reg. 1271(c) (July
6, 2010)).
121. Russell L. Weaver, “Advice and Consent” in Historical Perspective, 64 DUKE
L.J. 1717, 1730 (2015) (citing RICHARD S. BETH & BETSY PALMER, CONG. RES. SERV.,
RL33247, SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS: SENATE FLOOR PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE,
1789–2011, at 1 (2011)); see also Brannon P. Denning, The “Blue Slip”: Enforcing the Norms
of the Judicial Confirmation Process, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 85 (2001) (recounting 
episode in which Senator’s threat to withhold “blue slip” caused President to withdraw a 
nomination to the circuit court of appeals). 
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credentials and intellectual qualifications, but also his or her ideology.122 
As a consequence, to ensure confirmation, Presidents have tended to moderate 
their selections “in the direction of the Senate’s views.”123 Although 
information is not readily available about how often the respective elected 
bodies in merit-confirmation states vote to reject gubernatorial judicial
appointees, the mere existence of the confirmation protocol necessarily
constrains a governor’s choice of whom to appoint.  To the extent that the
confirming body is of a different political party than the governor, or does
not generally reflect the governor’s judicial ideology, the confirmation
requirement may pose a significant constraint on the governor’s appointment 
prerogative. 
Among merit-confirmation states, two states require that after the governor 
nominates one of the candidates forwarded by an independent judicial selection
commission, the nominee must be appointed by a majority of both houses 
122. Lee Epstein et al., The Changing Dynamics of Senate Voting on Supreme Court
Nominees, 68 J. POL. 296, 306 (2006).  Over the past thirty years, “Senate voting over judicial 
nominees has followed a new regime: one that deemphasizes ethics, competence, and integrity
and stresses instead politics, philosophy, and ideology.”  Id. at 296. According to one
commentator, “the Senate today appears bent on using its limited confirmation power to
impose ideological litmus tests on presidential nominees[,]” thereby “arrogating to itself the
nomination as well as the confirmation power.” John C. Eastman, The Limited Nature of 
the Senate’s Advice and Consent Role, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 633, 652 (2003). 
123. Weaver, supra note 121, at 1731. 
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124. In both Connecticut and Rhode Island, the governor is obligated to select from 
the commission’s list of nominees.  CONN. CONST. art. V, § 2; id. amends. XX, XXV; R.I.
CONST. art. X, § 4.  In Connecticut, at the conclusion of the judge’s original term, the judge 
may remain on the bench if re-nominated by the governor and reappointed by the 
legislature. CONN. CONST. art. V, § 2; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-44a (2015).  In Rhode 
Island, a state with no intermediate appellate court, members of the state supreme court enjoy
lifetime appointments.  R.I. CONST. art. X, § 4.
125. DEL. CONST. art IV, § 3; Del. Exec. Order No. 4, 12 Del. Reg. Regs. 1439 (May
1, 2009).  The judicial nominating commission in Delaware is created by executive order, 
and the governor may request a supplemental list of nominees if he or she is dissatisfied
with the first list.  Del. Exec. Order No. 4, 12 Del. Reg. Regs. 1439 (May 1, 2009). Under 
the state constitution, three of the five supreme court justices must be of one of the two 
major political parties and the other two justices must be of the other party.  DEL. CONST. 
art IV, § 3.  After completion of a justice’s twelve-year term, he or she must be reappointed 
by the governor and reconfirmed by the state senate. Id. 
126. HAW. CONST. art. VI, § 3. The governor must select from the list of nominees 
submitted by the judicial selection commission; if the governor fails to make the appointment 
within thirty days, the selection commission may do so.  Id.  Upon completion of a ten-year
term, the judge may be retained in office by vote of the judicial selection commission.  Id.; 
see also HAW. JUDICIAL SELECTION COMM’N RULES 12(E).
127. ME. CONST. art. V, § 8.  A bipartisan legislative committee made up of members
of both houses reviews the appointee and recommends confirmation or denial.  The
recommendation of that bipartisan group “shall become final action of confirmation or
denial” unless a two-thirds majority of those voting in the state senate overrides it. Id. By
executive order, the current governor appointed a fourteen-member judicial selection 
commission to advise him with respect to judicial appointments. See Me. Exec. Order 
No. 9 FY 94/95 (Feb. 10, 1995); Me. Exec. Order No. 3, 291 Me. Gov’t Reg. 1 (Apr. 2015) 
(referencing and reaffirming Executive Order No. 9 FY 94/95, which established the Governor’s 
Committee on Judicial Appointments); see also Methods of Judicial Selection: Maine, supra
note 120.  Once appointed, a Maine appellate judge enjoys a seven-year term.  ME. CONST. 
art. VI, § 4.
128. MD. CONST. art. IV, § 5A; Md. Exec. Order No. 01.01.2015.09, 42-4 Md. Reg.
416 (Feb. 20, 2015).  The Maryland governor established a judicial nominating commission by
executive order to recommend candidates for appointment to the appellate courts. Id.; see
also  NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, Judicial Selection in the States: Maryland, http:// 
www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=MD [https://perma.cc/Z2FZ-59CJ]
(last visited Nov. 16, 2016).  Once confirmed by the state senate, an appellate judge must 
stand for retention at the next general election following completion of his or her first year
on the bench, and every ten years thereafter.  MD. CONST. art. IV, § 5A(c)–(d). 
129. N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6, ¶ 1. The New Jersey governor appoints members of the 
supreme court and the superior court—the general jurisdiction trial court—subject to the 
advice and consent of the state senate.  Id. The appellate division of the superior court 
serves as the state’s intermediate court of appeals; its members are appointed from among
the superior court bench by the chief justice.  N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 3, ¶ 3, § 7, ¶ 2.  By
executive order, the governor has appointed a nominating commission that recommends 
candidates for judicial appointment, but the governor is not bound to select an applicant 
recommended by the commission.  N.J. Exec. Order No. 36, 38 N.J. Reg. 4525(b) (Nov. 6,
2006). By custom, the New Jersey governor generally replaces an outgoing judge with an
appointee of the same political party or philosophy. See NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 
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an appellate court after receiving recommendations of an independent
nominating commission, but the governor’s appointee may take the bench
only after confirmation by the state senate. 
In Massachusetts, candidates for the appeals court, but not the supreme
judicial court, are vetted by a judicial nomination commission created by 
executive order.132 The governor’s appointments to both courts are effective 
only upon confirmation by the Governor’s Council, also known as the Executive 
Council.133 The Governor’s Council is composed of the lieutenant governor
and eight others, who are elected by district every two years.134  In New 
Hampshire, the governor appoints members of the state supreme court, New
Hampshire’s only appellate court, subject to the consent of the five-member
elected Governor’s Council.135 Since 2000, a judicial selection commission 
created by executive order recommends applicants to the governor.136 
Finally, as referenced above, the members of New York’s highest appellate
court, the court of appeals, are appointed by the governor from nominees 
Judicial Selection in the States: New Jersey, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/
index.cfm?state=NJ [https://perma.cc/79AP-N99X] (last visited Nov. 16, 2016).  The seven- 
member supreme court traditionally is composed of three Democrats and three Republicans; 
the chief justice traditionally belongs to the party of the appointing governor. Id. After 
completion of an initial seven-year term, upon reappointment, appointees “shall hold their 
offices during good behavior” until mandatory retirement at seventy. N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 6,
¶ 3.
130. UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 8.  The governor is required to select from the list of nominees 
submitted by the judicial nominating commission. Id.  If the governor fails to make the 
appointment within thirty days, the chief justice of the supreme court may do so.  Id.  A newly
confirmed judge must stand for retention at the first general election more than three years 
after appointment. Id. § 9.  Thereafter, supreme court justices stand for retention every ten
years; court of appeals judges, every six years. Id.
 131. VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 32.  The governor must make the appointment from the list 
of nominees submitted by the nominating commission; after completion of the initial six-
year term, a judge may be retained on the bench unless a majority of those voting in the General
Assembly votes against retention. Id. §§ 32, 34.
132. Mass. Exec. Order No. 558, 1281 Mass. Reg. 1 (Feb. 27, 2015); Mass. Exec. Order 
No. 500, 1101 Mass. Reg. 9 (Apr. 4, 2008); Mass. Exec. Order No. 470, 1046 Mass. Reg.
3 (Feb. 24, 2006). 
133. MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. II, § 1, art. IX.  Judicial appointments in Massachusetts
are for life, subject to mandatory retirement at age seventy.  MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. III, art. I,
amended by MASS. CONST. amend. art. XCVIII. 
134. MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. II, § 3, art. I; MASS. CONST. amend. art. XVI, amended 
by MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXX, repealed by MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXXII. 
135. N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. XLVI, art. LX.  Once appointed, a judge on the supreme 
court sits until mandatory retirement at age 70.  N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. LXXVIII. 
136. Methods of Judicial Selection: New Hampshire, supra note 120; N.H. Exec. Order
No. 2013-06, 204 N.H. Gov’t Reg. 26 (LexisNexis May 2013). 
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III. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
A. Summary: Differences Among Benches Produced          
by the Various Selection Methods 
The data in the new set allow a fresh look at the characteristics other
researchers have studied and also allow analysis of a host of other objective 
characteristics, including more detailed information about the judges’ prior
legal careers and academic credentials.  Altogether, the data show that merit-
confirmation tends to produce the most distinctive appellate bench: those 
judges tend to have more years of legal experience and more judicial
experience, more are former prosecutors, more have other government-law 
experience, and more are former judicial clerks.  Judges in merit-selection
states, by contrast, tend to bear objective characteristics roughly comparable
to those in election states. Although, in general, the characteristics of judges 
in election states do not differ significantly from those of judges in other 
states, to a large extent, that is because so many of them first come to the bench 
by appointment, and those judges tend by large margins to bear the same 
characteristics of judges appointed through merit selection and merit– 
confirmation.  As reported previously, merit selection disadvantages women; 
the data suggest that may be a consequence of the nature of their respective
career paths. 
As a caveat, a study like this can reveal relationships, but proof of cause 
and effect can be elusive.  For one thing, the respective selection methods 
are not employed randomly across all regions of the United States.  With
important exceptions, judicial-election protocols tend to cluster in the South
and in the Great Lakes, while merit selection tends to be found in and around
the West and the Midwest, and merit-confirmation protocols tend to cluster
in the Northeast. For that reason, when a particular characteristic is more
commonly found among judges chosen by a particular selection method, 
we cannot know whether that is because of the states’ respective selection
methods, the preferences of their citizens, or the attributes of the judicial 
candidates who live in those states.138  Nevertheless, the data reveal some
powerful associations. 
137. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2(c), (e). Once confirmed, court of appeals judges serve 
fourteen-year terms.  N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2(a). 
138. See Canon, supra note 19, at 581 (based on a study of state supreme court members 
who sat between 1961 and 1968, “there are considerable differences in the justices’ backgrounds 
according to geographical region”); see also GEORGE & YOON, supra note 13, at 6 (showing 
judicial selection methods using a color-coded map of the United States). 
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Before discussing the data in detail, first, a broad snapshot of all the 
1,285 appellate judges in the set.  Their personal demographics: 
 Average age at selection: fifty-one
 35% are women 
 15% are non-white 
With respect to career paths: 
 83% have private-practice experience 
 64% have prior judicial experience, usually service on a state
trial court 
 38% have prosecutorial experience
 25% have served as a government lawyer in a capacity other than
as a prosecutor 
 12% served in legal aid or as a public defender 
As for education and other scholarly credentials: 
 73% attended an un-ranked in-state law school
 63% attended an un-ranked in-state undergraduate institution 
 27% served a judicial clerkship 
 26% served on a college or law-school faculty, either part-time 
or full-time, before or after coming on the bench 
 15% attended a ranked undergraduate institution 
 13% published law review articles before taking the bench 
 12% attended a ranked law school
 7% are elected members of the American Law Institute 
Table 1 shows the proportion of judges with these attributes, by selection
method.139  There are many similarities across the various benches, but some
differences stand out. 
1. Age
The data reveal statistically significant differences across the various
selection methods in the ages at which the judges were chosen.  On the 
average, the judges were just under fifty-one and one-half years old when
they first joined the appellate bench. By a slight but statistically significant 
margin, judges in election states are younger than those in merit-selection, 
139. See infra Table 1. 
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Women represent a little more than 35% of the judges, across all selection 
methods.  Proportionately more women are on the bench in partisan-election
states than in states that use any other selection method. As noted, 
a significantly smaller proportion of merit-selected judges, roughly 29%, 
are female.141 
3. Race or Ethnicity 
Overall, nearly 15% of the judges in the data set are non-white. No
statistically significant differences appear across the various selection
methods.142 
4. Prior Judicial Experience
Across all selection methods, 64% of the judges have some prior judicial 
experience, including experience on a trial court or, in the case of a judge on 
a state’s court of last resort, on an intermediate appellate court.  By a statistically
significant margin, however, appellate judges in merit-confirmation states are
most likely to have prior judicial experience, at nearly 75%, and judges in
non-partisan election states are least likely to have prior judicial experience, at
roughly 58%.143 
5. Private-Practice Experience
Judges in election states and those chosen through merit selection are
significantly more likely to have practiced in the private sector than judges 
in merit-confirmation states.144 
6. Commercial Law/Business Law Experience
This study sought to identify the judges with commercial-law or business- 
law experience, or who otherwise had practiced complex civil litigation 
before coming to the bench.  Because of the ambiguous nature of the available
information for many of the judges, this classification is more subjective
 140. See infra Table 1. 
141. See infra Table 1. 
142. See infra Table 1. 
143. See infra Table 1. 
144. See infra Table 1. 
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than the others, and includes all of the judges who practiced in large law
firms before they became judges, even if the specific nature of their practices 
could not be determined.  Any differences across selection methods in the 
percentages of judges who practiced commercial law are not significant.
This is true even though far more judges selected by the legislature have 
commercial-law experience than average.145 
7. Former Prosecutors
Researchers studying state courts of last resort in 1980–81 concluded
that a little fewer than a quarter of their members were former prosecutors.146 
The judges in the current data set, who include intermediate appellate court 
members as well as members of state courts of last resort, are considerably 
more likely to have prosecutorial experience—overall, nearly 38% are former 
prosecutors. To a statistically significant degree, merit-confirmation states
choose more former prosecutors for their appellate benches than states
using any other judicial selection method.  Partisan-election states follow 
not far behind.147 
8. Former Non-Prosecutorial Government Lawyers
Any judge who held a non-prosecutorial role in government legal service
is categorized as a former “government lawyer.”  Included in this category
are judges who served as in-house counsel to a state agency, counsel to a city
or state executive, or who practiced civil litigation in the office of a state 
attorney general or municipal or county attorney.  Perhaps not surprisingly, 
judges whose appointments required confirmation by a government body
or who were selected by the legislature are significantly more likely to have
government- law experience.148
 145. See infra Table 1. 
146. 
147. 
 Glick & Emmert, supra note 12, at 232 tbl.1. 
See infra Table 1. 
148. Glick and Emmert’s study of state high-court members in 1980–81 found that 
78.6% of judges selected by the legislature had themselves been legislators; judges with
prior legislative service totaled no more than 21% in any of the other selection methods.  Glick
& Emmert, supra note 12, at 232 tbl.1.  Among all supreme court justices serving in 1999, 
10.4% were former legislators.  Martin & Pyle, supra note 12, at 42 tbl.2. 
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9. Former Legal Aid/Criminal Defense Lawyers
On the average, 12% of all the judges have some experience in legal aid, 
poverty law, or criminal defense agencies.  Only slight differences appear
across the various selection methods.149 
10. Judicial Clerkships 
Merit–confirmation puts the highest percentage of former clerks on the
bench. Nearly 32% of all judges in the data set who were selected through 
merit–confirmation served judicial clerkships; slightly more than 26% of 
judges appointed through merit selection clerked.150 
11. Education 
Earlier researchers studying judges on state courts of last resort in 1980
and before found that more than 80% of the judges in partisan-election states 
attended in-state undergraduate or law schools.151  In 1980, just under 70%
of all supreme court members were educated in-state; by 1999, that percentage 
declined somewhat: roughly 59% attended college or law school in their 
state.152  The later data set revealed that white women and non-white men, but
not non-white women, were less likely to have been educated in state.153 
In the current data set of state supreme court and intermediate appellate
court judges, there are similarly strong in-state education connections among 
judges in election states.  Of judges in partisan-election states, 84% attended 
in-state law schools, as did 72% of judges in non-partisan election states. 
At 61%, judges selected by merit–confirmation are least likely to have done 
so. Judges in partisan-election states also are the most likely to have attended 
an in-state undergraduate institution; 75% of them did so.154 
Prior researchers found that, among judges on state courts of last resort
in 1980–81, 50% of those who came to the bench through gubernatorial
appointment, not including merit-selected judges, attended what the authors
called “prestigious” law schools; 16% selected by merit did so, but fewer 
than 10% of judges selected by any other method did so.155  Similarly, 27.3%
of gubernatorial appointment judges in that data set went to “prestigious” 
149. See infra Table 1. 
150. See infra Table 1. 
151.  Canon, supra note 19, at 589 tbl.1; Glick & Emmert, supra note 12, at 232 tbl.1. 
 152.  Martin & Pyle, supra note 12, at 46 tbl.5. 
153.  Id. 
 154.  See infra Table 1. 
 155.  Glick & Emmert, supra note 12, at 232 tbl.1. 
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undergraduate institutions; fewer than 10% of the judges selected by any
other selection method did so.156 
The U.S. News and World Report rankings were used to identify ranked
law schools and undergraduate institutions for purposes of this study.157 
The ten highest-ranked law schools and the twenty highest-ranked colleges 
or universities are designated as “ranked” institutions for this study.158 
The proportion of all the judges in the current set who graduated from
ranked law schools is not large—only 11.5%—but there are wide differences
among selection methods.  Larger proportions of the judges in legislative-
selection and merit-confirmation states21% and 17%, respectively
attended ranked law schools.  By contrast, only 3% of the judges in partisan- 
election states did so.159 
Judges sitting in partisan-election states also are significantly less likely 
to have attended a ranked undergraduate institution.  But, by contrast to the 
results with law schools, judges selected by the legislature are least likely
to have attended a ranked undergraduate institution.  The highest proportion 
of judges who attended ranked undergraduate schools is seen in non-partisan
election states—at 18%—followed closely by judges selected by merit-
confirmation and by merit selection.160
 156. Id. 
157. The rankings showed little variability from 2000-2015; the 2015 rankings therefore
were selected for sake of convenience. 
158. If a judge graduated from a ranked institution located in the state in which he or
she sits, this study counts the judge as having attended a ranked school, not an in-state school.
It is of course true that a host of law schools and undergraduate institutions that are unranked
by this measure provide excellent educations to their students; likewise, there may be little 
to distinguish the tenth-ranked law school from the twelfth-ranked law school, or the eighteenth-
ranked college or university from the twenty-second.  Judges’ class rankings might have 
been a more valid measure of their academic success or intellectual prowess, but those data 
were not readily available.  Recognizing further that many high-achieving students who are 
admitted to ranked institutions cannot afford to enroll, national law-school and college rankings 
nevertheless provide some measure of their students’ intellect—because ranked institutions are
more selective—and, to a greater or lesser extent, the quality of their graduates’ legal training. 
159. Other researchers have observed that fewer judges on courts of last resort in election
states are graduates of ranked law schools. See Choi et al., supra note 48, at 327. 
160. See infra Table 1. 
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12. Other Scholarly Measures 
This study identified law review articles published by judges in the data
set before their authors went on the bench. There are no significant differences 
in those numbers among the judges, by selection method.161 
By a significant margin, however, judges in merit-confirmation states 
are more likely to have been elected to the American Law Institute; judges 
in partisan-election states are next most likely to be elected ALI members.162 
Finally, the data identified judges who taught part-time or full-time at a 
college, university or law school either before or after they came to the bench. 
Of the judges surveyed, 26% served in some faculty capacity.  By a statistically
significant margin, judges appointed by merit-confirmation or chosen by
legislative selection were more likely to have taught at the undergraduate 
or graduate level.163 
B. Merit Selection and Merit-Confirmation 
The data plainly disprove the hypothesis that merit-selected judges as a
group tend to be more scholarly and more likely to have business-law
backgrounds than judges chosen by other selection methods.  To the contrary, 
the objective characteristics of the judges chosen by merit selection, on the
whole, are not dissimilar in most respects from those chosen by all selection 
methods, taken together. Merit-selected judges are slightly less likely than 
average to be former prosecutors and slightly less likely to have practiced
other forms of government law.  To be sure, they are slightly more likely than
average to have attended a ranked law school, but other selection methods 
boast a higher percentage of ranked law-school graduates.  And proportionately
far fewer merit-selected judges than average are elected members of ALI. 
Although the hypothesis about merit selection did not prove correct, 
that is not to say that all selection methods produce benches with roughly
the same combination of characteristics.  It turned out that merit-confirmation, 
not merit selection, results in courts with the most distinctive mix of
characteristics. As shown in Table 1, judges selected by merit-confirmation have
significantly more years of legal experience and are significantly older than 
other judges, by two years or more.164  Significantly higher percentages of
merit-confirmation judges served judicial clerkships, are elected members of
ALI, and have taught in college or graduate school.  A significantly greater 
percentage of merit-confirmation judges arrived at the appellate court having 
161. See infra Table 1 
162. See infra Table 1. 
163. See infra Table 1. 
164. See infra Table 1. 
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already served on another bench.  On the other hand, a significantly smaller 
percentage of merit-confirmation judges come from private practice; instead,
they are the most likely of all judges to have served as prosecutors or in
other government-law positions.
Do the constraints imposed by the confirmation process in merit-
confirmation states cause those benches to have a significantly different 
mix of characteristics than those in merit-selection states?  Table 2 compares
those two subsets of judges.165  By and large, just as judges chosen by merit- 
confirmation are significantly different in many respects from other judges 
overall, benches in merit-confirmation states are significantly different
from those in merit-selection states.  By significant margins, more merit-
confirmation judges than merit-selected judges are former prosecutors or 
other government lawyers, and more came to their current positions with
prior judicial experience.  On the other hand, merit-selected judges are
significantly more likely than merit-confirmation judges to come from 
private practice. With respect to education credentials, judges selected by
merit-confirmation are significantly less likely than merit-selected judges 
to have attended in-state law schools and in-state undergraduate institutions.
Correspondingly, merit-confirmation judges are more likely to have attended 
ranked law schools or undergraduate schools, although the difference is
not statistically significant.  Judges selected by merit-confirmation are
significantly more likely than merit-selected judges to have taught at the 
college or law school level, to have been elected to the American Law Institute, 
and to have published in a law review before coming to the bench.
The selection mechanisms employed in merit-confirmation states deserve 
further scrutiny, particularly in view of the distinctive mix of characteristics
among the judges on the appellate bench in those states.  Although strict 
merit-selection protocols are not in place in merit-confirmation states,
the governor’s appointment decisions are constrained in those states 
by an independent judicial nominating commission, just as in merit-selection 
states.  The fact that judges selected by merit-confirmation are significantly 
different in many objective respects from those chosen by merit selection
suggests that the additional constraint imposed by a confirmation requirement
may have demonstrable effects. As noted above, commentators have argued
that in the federal judicial appointment process, the Senate’s power of advice 
and consent significantly constrains Presidential appointment power.  In a
similar fashion, it seems likely that governors in merit-confirmation states
 165. See infra Table 2. 
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favor applicants they expect will appeal to the members of the elected
body that must confirm judicial appointments.  This may explain why more 
appellate judges in merit-confirmation states share objective credentials such
as prior judicial experience, longer legal careers, and judicial clerkships.166 
In any event, these results, as well as the significantly greater proportion of 
merit-confirmation judges who come to the bench with prosecutorial experience
and experience in other government law, deserve further research. 
C. Implications of Popular Election of Judges 
The data allow broad comparisons to be drawn between appellate judges
in election states, both partisan and non-partisan, and appellate judges chosen
by merit selection or merit–confirmation.  They also permit analysis of two 
distinct aspects of popular election of judges: (1) whether the objective
characteristics of judges appointed to fill interim vacancies in election states 
differ significantly from those of their elected colleagues; and (2) whether
the characteristics of judges in partisan-election states differ significantly
from those of judges in non-partisan election states.
1. Judges in Election States Compared to Judges in  
Merit-Selection, Merit-Confirmation States 
As shown in Table 2, there are some significant differences between the 
characteristics of appellate judges in election states and those in merit-selection
and merit-confirmation states, taken together.167  Judges in election states are
significantly more likely to be female than judges in merit-selection and
merit-confirmation states.168  Judges in election states are significantly younger 
and have correspondingly less legal experience than those selected by merit
or merit-confirmation.  By significant margins, judges in election states are
less likely to have prior judicial experience but more likely to have private- 
practice experience.  Not surprisingly, a significantly greater proportion of
166. Plenty of bright young law graduates choose not to seek judicial clerkships;
nevertheless, given that judges tend to hire their clerks from students at the top of their law 
school classes, a judicial clerkship is an objective indication of intellectual merit. See Zoe
Tillman, Federal Appeals Judges Open Up About Clerk-Hiring Preferences, NAT’L LAW 
J. (Nov. 16, 2015), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202742506773/Federal-Appeals­
Judges-Open-Up-About-ClerkHiring-Preferences [https://perma.cc/NLA3-ENNV].
167. See infra Table 2. 
168. Women are selected for the appellate bench in election states at a higher rate 
than they are elected to other state offices.  Of all the judges in election states on the bench 
in 2015, nearly 39% are women. See infra Table 2.  By contrast, in 2016, women represented
about 25% all statewide elective officials and state legislators.  Susan J. Carroll, Women
in State Government: Still Too Few, in THE BOOK OF THE STATES 2016, at 448, 450, 452 
(2016). 
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judges in election states attended in-state law schools and undergraduate 
schools. By contrast, a significantly greater percentage of merit-selected
and merit-confirmation judges attended ranked law schools. 
2. Interim Appointments in Election States 
Upon close inspection, however, the comparison between the benches 
in election states and in appointment states is not as simple as it might 
appear. When an interim vacancy occurs in a state in which judges are elected,
the governor usually is empowered to fill the vacancy by appointment, and 
that appointed judge then runs as an incumbent in the next election.  Holmes 
and Emrey reported that 52% of judges on state courts of last resort in election 
states initially came to the bench by way of appointment.169  Of the judges
on state courts of last resort and intermediate appellate courts in 2015 who
sit in election states, 41% first came to the bench by appointment. 
It has been commonly thought that the precise means by which judges
first come to the bench in election states—by election or by interim
appointment—does not matter very much.  For that proposition, most
researchers cite Glick and Emmert, who reported that the only significant
objective difference between elected members of state supreme courts in 
1980–81 and their colleagues who were appointed to fill interim vacancies 
was that the first-elected judges were more likely to have been born in the 
state they serve.170 In one sense, it does not matter whether a judge in an 
election state has been elected or appointed: the product of popular election
as a means to select appellate judges is the entire composition of the appellate
bench, including the judges who are first elected and those who are first 
appointed to fill interim vacancies.  But distinctions between the two groups
deserve analysis, if, for no other reason, because of the sheer numbers
of those who are first appointed.  Moreover, regardless of how a judge
comes to the bench for the first time in an election state, he or she is likely 
to be reelected or retained in office.171  To the extent that governors tend
169. Lisa M. Holmes & Jolly A. Emrey, Court Diversification: Staffing the State Courts 
of Last Resort Through Interim Appointments, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 1 (2006). 
170.  Glick & Emmert, supra note 12, at 231. 
171. Studying elections between 2000 and 2006, Streb, Frederick, and LaFrance found
that 64.7% of state supreme court elections were contested, but only 26.6% of intermediate 
appellate court elections were contested.  Matthew J. Streb et al., Contestation, Competition, 
and the Potential for Accountability in Intermediate Appellate Court Elections, 91 JUDICATURE
70, 73 tbl.1, 74.  The same data show that when challenged, only 12.5% of state supreme 
court justices were defeated and 8% of intermediate appellate court judges were defeated.  
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to appoint judges with significantly different characteristics than those who 
are elected, therefore, study of those differences will advance understanding 
of the implications of popular election of judges, as a selection method.
Although some researchers have considered the gender, race, and ethnicity
of appointed judges in election states as a distinct group, no other study
compares a wide range of objective characteristics of the judges in election 
states who are first appointed with those who are first elected. 
Table 3 shows that, in several respects, appointed judges in election states 
bear significantly different characteristics from those of their elected
colleagues.172 Interim appointments usually have the effect of bringing the 
appellate benches in election states more in line with the norm produced 
by other selection methods.  For example, among the statistically significant 
differences between elected and appointed judges in election states is that
a significantly greater proportion of the appointed judges are non-white.
This is particularly true in non-partisan election states, where more than 18%
of the appointed judges but only 5% of the elected judges are non-white. By 
contrast, there is virtually no distinction between the proportion of women
among judges first appointed and first elected to the bench in election states.
Judges in election states who first come to the bench by appointment, 
particularly in partisan-election states, are considerably more likely to have
some commercial- or business-law experience than those who are elected.
The opposite is true with prosecutorial experience, particularly in partisan-
election states.  Judges appointed to fill interim vacancies in partisan-election 
states are far less likely than those first elected to have practiced in legal
aid or criminal defense, but no such distinction is seen in non-partisan election 
states. As for prior government-law experience, the proportion of judges 
actually elected in non-partisan election states who have practiced in
government is smaller than in any other group of judges.  When appointing 
authorities fill interim vacancies in non-partisan election states, however, 
nearly 24% of their appointments have prior government-law experience. 
Turning to education, judges appointed to fill interim vacancies in election 
states are significantly less likely to have attended in-state law schools than
those who are first elected.  Although proportionately more appointees in
Id. at 76. Bonneau and Hall found that, among judges on state courts of last resort between
1990 and 2004, only 5.2% of the incumbents in non-partisan election states who ran for
reelection were defeated, whereas 31% in partisan-election states were defeated.  BONNEAU &
HALL, supra note 5, at Table 4.4.  They found that judges appointed to fill interim vacancies are 
more likely to face a challenger when they run for election for the first time, and that appointed
judges facing election for the first time generally performed “just over 3 percent worse,
other things being equal, than their colleagues who have previously won elections to the high 
court bench.”  Id. at 97, 99.
 172. See infra Table 3. 
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partisan-election states attended ranked law schools than those first elected, 
the opposite is true, by a wide margin, in non-partisan election states. 
With respect to other intellectual credentials, significantly more elected 
members of the American Law Institute come to the bench through
appointment than by election in partisan-election states, but there is virtually 
no distinction among the numbers of elected ALI members appointed and 
elected in non-partisan election states.  Finally, by a significant margin, 
judges who are first appointed in election states are more likely to have
published a law review article before coming to the bench than those 
who are first elected.  The difference is particularly striking among judges 
in partisan-election states.
3. Partisan Elections and Non-Partisan Elections 
The data also allow analysis of whether appellate benches in partisan-
election states are significantly different from appellate benches in non­
partisan election states.  This analysis takes as a given that in both selection 
systems, a considerable number of the judges do not first come to the bench
by election, but are appointed to fill interim vacancies.  The question is whether 
the partisan or non-partisan nature of the two systems makes a difference 
in the resulting appellate benches. 
At the outset, it should be noted that, in reality, it may be that many
non-partisan judicial elections are only nominally so.  For this study, Ohio 
is characterized as a partisan-election state, even though its judges are elected 
in ostensibly non-partisan general elections, because state law allows political
parties wide latitude to participate in the non-partisan general election
campaigns.173  Even without the explicit endorsement of law, similar partisan 
influences may be brought to bear during general elections in other ostensibly
non-partisan election states. Washington, for example, elects its judges in
non-partisan general elections, but judges are nominated in partisan primary 
elections and the nominees typically seek party endorsements during their 
general election campaigns.174  According to one former Chief Justice in
Washington, voters are very much aware of judges’ party affiliations, and 
judicial candidates’ success at the polls parallels their parties’ success in other 
general election contests.175  And in Michigan, although court of appeals
 173. See discussion supra at Part II.B.1.
 174. Charles Wiggins, The Washington State Supreme Court Election of 2006: Factors 
at Work and Lessons Learned, 46 JUDGES’ J. 33, 36 (2007). 
175. Id. at 36–37. 
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judges are nominated and run in non-partisan elections, supreme court
justices are nominated in partisan fashion but run in the general election
on a non-partisan basis.176 
With these caveats, there are very few statistically significant differences
between members of the appellate benches in partisan-election states and
those in non-partisan election states.177 
Appellate judges in both partisan- and non-partisan election states are 
significantly younger and have fewer years of legal experience than their 
peers in other states when they take the bench.  The same is true with prior 
judicial experience; significantly fewer judges in election states have prior 
experience on another bench, but the difference between judges in partisan- 
and non-partisan election states is not significant.  By a significant margin, 
judges in election states are more likely to have private-practice experience, 
but there is no significant difference between the percentages of judges in 
partisan- and non-partisan election states with such experience.
Significant differences do appear, however, between the benches in
partisan- and non-partisan election states when it comes to localism and 
academic credentials.  The differences perhaps reflect, on the one hand,
political parties’ preferences for localism, and, on the other, the preferences of
voters in non-partisan election states for judicial candidates with objective
credentials signifying intellectual merit.  Judges in partisan-election states are
far more likely to have attended in-state law schools and undergraduate 
institutions than judges in non-partisan election states. Correspondingly,
judges in non-partisan election states are significantly more likely to have
attended ranked law schools and ranked undergraduate institutions.  Finally,
judges in non-partisan election states also are significantly more likely to 
have authored law review articles before coming to the bench.
D. Women on State Appellate Benches 
1. Under-Representation of Women on Benches         
Chosen by Merit Selection 
Most of the recent research concerning the outcomes of the various
judicial selection methods focused on the extent to which they promote
women and minorities to the bench.178  The data collected for this study,
however, offer additional insights.
The table below shows the proportion of women among appellate judges
in the current data set according to when they took the bench.  Only 18%
 176. 
177. 
MICH. CONST. art. VI, §§ 2, 8.
See infra Table 4. 
178. See discussion supra at Part I. 
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of judges sitting in 2015 who took the bench before 1990 are women.
Beginning in the 1990s, however, women made significant strides across 
all selection methods, peaking at slightly more than 40% among judges 
selected between 2006 and 2010 and settling to a little more than 35% of 











Women on State Courts of Last Resort 
and Intermediate Appellate Courts in 
2015 (by Percent), by Year of Selection 
Although fewer than half of all state appellate judges on the bench in 2015 
are female, their proportional representation does not compare unfavorably 
with U.S. employment data.  According to the U.S. Statistical Abstract, 22.2% of
the lawyers employed in 1989 were female.179 By 2014, when more than
35% of all state appellate judges were female, women represented 32.9% 
of all employed lawyers in the country.180  According to the American Bar 
Association, 35% of the licensed lawyers in the United States in 2015 were
 179. U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, SECTION 
13: LABOR FORCE, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 395 tbl.652 (1991). 
180. U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, HOUSEHOLD
DATA: ANNUAL AVERAGES 3 tbl.11 (2014). 
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female.181 These observations are consistent with some studies concluding
that the advancement of minority and female lawyers to the bench is related
to their numbers in the pool of lawyers from which judges are drawn.182 
The progress of women is not uniform across all selection methods,
however. Table 5 shows the proportion of appellate judges in the set who
are female, by selection method and selection date.183 Women are chosen
for state appellate courts at a statistically significantly lower rate in merit-
selection states than in other states.  Although more than 35% of all the judges 
in the data set are female, fewer than 29% of the judges in merit-selection 
states are female.  No other selection method produces female appellate 
judges at a rate below 34%.184  A separate multivariate analysis, Table 6, 
reveals that, holding all other factors constant and by a statistically significant 
margin, a state appellate judge selected by merit is 31% less likely to be a 
woman than a judge selected by any other method.185 
Why do women seem to struggle for appointment in merit-selection states? 
By itself, a system in which the governor appoints a judge from among
candidates vetted by an independent commission does not disproportionately 
disadvantage women: more than 36% of the appellate judges on the bench
in 2015 selected through merit-confirmation are women.  At bottom, merit 
181. AM. BAR ASS’N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS (2015). 
182. REDDICK ET AL., supra note 69, at 3. These researchers concluded, however,
that although there is a link between the number of female attorneys in a state and the number 
of women on that state’s intermediate appellate court, the same cannot be said about women’s
representation on a state’s court of last resort. Id. at 6. Of course, no state appellate bench 
perfectly reflects the demographics of the state’s population, which may be quite different
from those of the bar. See BERRY, supra note 13, at 5; GEORGE & YOON, supra note 13, 
at 11, 18. 
183. See infra Table 5. 
184. See infra Table 1.  Although this study does not analyze state voter registration
numbers, Reddick et al., found that more female judges are elected in states in which
Democrats hold an edge in voter registration than in states in which Republicans outnumber
Democrats.  Malia Reddick, Michael J. Nelson & Rachel Paine Caufield, Racial and Gender
Diversity on State Courts: An AJS Study, 48 JUDGES’ J. 28, 30 (2009).  Likewise, they observed
that more minorities are elected to the intermediate appellate bench in states in which 
Democrats outnumber Republicans than in states in which Republicans have the edge. Id.
185. Looking separately at the benches of state supreme courts and intermediate appellate
courts in this Article’s data set, merit selection places a smaller proportion of women both 
on high courts, at 30%, and intermediate appellate courts, at 28%, than any other selection
method.  The margin across all selection methods is statistically significant among the latter but
not among the former.  Reddick et al., studied state appellate and trial court judges in 2005. 
They found that although 37.6% of all of the members of states’ intermediate appellate 
courts sitting in 2005 were the products of merit selection, only 27.5% of women on those 
benches were merit-selected.  REDDICK ET AL., supra note 69, at 4 tbl.2.  Multivariate analysis
confirmed their conclusion that “merit selection placed significantly fewer women on intermediate
appellate courts than did partisan or nonpartisan elections.” Id. at 6.  They found, however, 
that “merit selection and gubernatorial appointment systems did not place more, or fewer, 
women on state high courts or trial courts than did popular elections.” Id.
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selection allows a governor discretion to make an appointment from nominees 
submitted by an independent group of citizens who have systematically
researched and interviewed the candidates.  One study of ten states concluded 
that, in general, nominating commissions in merit-selection states tend to 
forward female nominees to the governor at rates comparable to women’s 
representation among applicants.186  Whether governors in merit-selection states 
tend to disproportionately select male nominees over female nominees because
of political influences that favor men over women cannot be determined. 
But politics in general is not a sufficient explanation. After all, for women,
the single most favorable appellate judicial selection method is partisan election, 
with non-partisan election not far behind.
At the end of the day in merit selection, the governor’s choice of whom
to appoint is subject to an unquantifiable mix of factors and influences,
including, of course, the governor’s ideological predilections.187  The outcome
also may depend in part on the governor’s prior appointments, the existing 
composition of the appellate benches in the state, the overall political climate 
in the state, the strength and nature of the judicial candidates’ records, and
the weight of the influence their respective advocates may bring to bear
on the nominating commission and the governor.188
 186. ESTERLING & ANDERSEN, supra note 34, at 17.  By contrast, these researchers
found that the nominating commissions forwarded minority candidates at a slightly higher 
rate than in the applicant pool. Id. at 17–18. 
187. When Henry studied appointed appellate judges in 1985, he observed that the 
numbers of women and minorities named to the bench varied greatly depending on the 
governor. HENRY ET AL., supra note 62, at 25–27, 68–69.  In California, for example, Gov.
Edmund G. “Pat” Brown appointed twenty-six members of the appellate courts between 
1959 and 1965; none of the appellate judges he appointed was a woman, and only two were 
non-whites. Id. at 25.  Brown’s successor, Gov. Ronald Reagan, appointed twenty men—
no women—to the appellate bench between 1967 and 1974, and only one of them was
non-white. Id. at 25.  By contrast, Gov. Edmund G. “Jerry” Brown appointed sixty-five
appellate judges, among them eleven women and eleven non-whites, between 1975-1982. 
Id. at 25; see Hurwitz & Lanier, supra note 12, at 56 (listing appointments by Democratic 
and Republican governors). 
188. According to a study of all state appellate and general jurisdiction judges on the 
bench in 2008, Democratic governors appointed minorities—14.7%—and women—
27.9%—at a higher rate than Republican governors, at 11% and 23.6%, respectively.  Reddick 
et al., supra note 184, at 30.  Considering appellate benches separately, Democratic governors 
appointed women to state courts of last resort and intermediate appellate courts at rates of
31.3% and 31.2%, respectively, compared to 28.3% and 23.3%, respectively, by Republican 
governors.  Id. at 32. Democratic governors appointed minorities to state courts of last resort
and intermediate appellate courts at rates of 17.4% and 16.2%; for Republican governors, 
the comparable numbers were 8.8% and 10.5%. Id. These data are consistent with the findings
of scholars who have observed that liberal officeholders are more likely to select women 
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2. Clues Among the Data: Why Are Women Under-Represented             
in Merit Selection? 
Perhaps an explanation of why merit selection seems to disadvantage 
women lies in the characteristics of the judges chosen by the various selection 
methods. Toward that end, this Article first will compare the attributes of 
female judges with the attributes of male judges across all selection methods. 
The focus then will turn to the characteristics of women chosen by merit
selection to examine whether merit selection tends to (1) value certain
characteristics in women differently than other judicial selection methods 
do, or (2) differently than merit selection itself values those characteristics in 
men.
Table 7 broadly compares selected characteristics of the female judges 
in the data set with those of the male judges.189  By a statistically significant 
margin, female judges are much more likely than male judges to be non­
white.190  Multivariate analysis confirms the link between judges’ gender
and race: as shown in Table 6, to a statistically significant degree and holding 
all other factors constant, a white judge is 46% less likely than a non-white 
judge to be a woman. 
Table 7 shows other differences between the female and male judges. 
By statistically significant margins, the female judges are less likely to have
private-practice experience than the male judges, and the women who practiced
in the private sector did so for fewer years.191  The disparity in private-
practice experience is not surprising. Historically, more male lawyers than
female lawyers have joined private law firms and remained in private
practice for significant periods.  According to a study by the American Bar
Association in 2005, 76.3% of the male lawyers in the United States were 
in private practice; only 71.6% of the female lawyers were in private 
practice.192  Although many law firms have created new non-partner tiers 
for lawyers with several years of experience, the appellate judges on the
bench in 2015 who came from private practice presumably came from the
ranks of partners.  But data collected by the National Association of Women 
and minorities for the bench.  See, e.g., Bratton & Spill, supra note 11, at 514; Hurwitz et al., 
supra note 118, at 338. 
189. See infra Table 7. 
190. See infra Part III.E (discussing non-whites’ representation in the set of appellate 
judges).
191. The multivariate analysis in Table 6 demonstrates the same statistically significant
outcome from a different perspective: holding all other factors constant, a judge with private-
practice experience is 38% less likely to be a woman than a judge with another career path.
See infra Table 6. 
192. CLARA N. CARSON & JEEYOON PARK, AM. BAR FOUND., THE LAWYER STATISTICAL
REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2005, at 9 (2012). 
876
JOHNSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2018 10:47 AM     
 












     
  
  
      
 
    
  
  
     
    
 
 
   
 
     
   
      
   
     
         
 
[VOL. 53:  829, 2016] Building a Bench 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
Lawyers in 2015 show that women make up only 18% of law firm equity
partners and 28% of non-equity partners.193 
Beyond these differences, Table 7 shows no other statistically significant 
distinctions between the career paths of female judges in the overall data 
set and their male counterparts.194  Given that, generally speaking, women
are represented overall on state appellate benches at about the same rate 
as they are present in the practicing bar, among most selection methods it 
appears that career paths other than private practice provide women with
satisfactory routes to the bench.  Conversely, it appears that only in merit-
selection states may a lack of private-practice experience disadvantage
a female judicial aspirant.
Looking at other characteristics, female judges are more than a year 
younger than their male counterparts at the time of selection, a statistically 
significant margin.  One reason may lie in the relative opportunity costs men 
and women must pay to join the bench.  That is, to the extent that more 
men are earning lucrative incomes in private practice, they must forego more 
income to become judges than the women who seek to move to the bench from 
government-law, legal-aid, or criminal-defense practices.195 
193. Lauren Stiller Rikleen, Women Lawyers Continue to Lag Behind Male Colleagues:
Report of the Ninth Annual NAWL National Survey on Retention and Promotion of Women 
in Law Firms, WOMEN LAW. J., no. 4, 2015, at 25, 26.  These findings are consistent with 
those reported by the ABA, which found that women made up only 20.2% of all partners
and 17% of equity partners in private law firms. AM. BAR ASS’N, A CURRENT GLANCE AT
WOMEN IN THE LAW 2 (2014) [hereinafter ABA].  The NAWL data reflect a slight upward 
progression for women, although it is not consistent year over year.  According to the NAWL, 
24% of new equity partners in 2014 were women, and “[a]mong the non-equity partners
who graduated from law school in 2004 and later, 38 percent were women . . . .” Rikleen, 
supra, at 29–30.  Both studies reported that about 44% of the associates in private law firms are
women. Id. at 26; ABA, supra, at 2.  Observers cite many different factors for why women 
fail to progress into partnership ranks at the same rate as men, including: 
[T]he impact of children and other family responsibilities on women’s careers;
bias, whether implicit or explicit; male-centered social norms and expectations 
about how to progress; outdated law firm cultures, policies, and structures that 
hinder the development of talent from diverse lawyers; the short-term business 
focus of many firms; and social norms among men versus women with respect to
rainmaking and client development. 
STEPHANIE A. SCHARF & ROBERTA D. LIEBENBERG, AM. BAR FOUND., FIRST CHAIRS AT
TRIAL: MORE WOMEN NEED SEATS AT THE TABLE 3–4 (2015).
194. The female judges are more likely than the male judges to have served as criminal-
defense or legal-aid lawyers or as civil-practice government lawyers, but the differences are not
quite statistically significant. See infra Table 7. 
195. The age difference between men and women in this data set is consistent with what
Martin et al., observed between men and women on states’ highest courts in 1999.  At that 
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Table 6 also shows that, holding all other factors constant and by statistically 
significant margins, a judge who has been elected to the American Law
Institute is much more likely to be a woman, as is a judge who has served
a judicial clerkship.  Judicial clerkships generally are awarded to recent law
graduates based on class standing, faculty recommendations, writing ability,
and service on academic law journals.  While nearly 30% of the female judges
are former judicial clerks, only 25% of the male judges chose to clerk.196 
It seems likely that new law-school graduates who are temperamentally
inclined to seek judicial clerkships might include lawyers who, years later,
would seek the intellectual challenges of the appellate bench.197  That a higher 
proportion of the women than the men in the data set are former judicial
law clerks, however, may indicate another factor also is at work.  Although
the difference between the percentages of former judicial clerks among 
the women and the men across all selection methods is—barely—not
statistically significant, a clerkship might be an alternative means by which a
woman may demonstrate the intelligence, integrity, and legal ability required
for the appellate bench.  This may be particularly true with respect to women
who, for reasons of temperament or work/life balance, decide not to pursue
partnerships in large law firms or high-profile positions in other legal arenas.198 
Academic credentials might afford the same women another means of 
demonstrating they are worthy of judicial appointment.  But by a significant 
margin, fewer female judges than male judges boast a degree from a ranked
law school; more of the women than the men attended law school in the 
state in which they sit.199 
The object of this analysis is to discern whether merit selection treats 
certain characteristics in women differently than other selection methods 
treat those characteristics, and ultimately, whether merit selection treats 
those characteristics differently in women than in men. Toward that end, 
the focus next turns to differences between the characteristics of male and 
female judges produced by the respective selection methods.
time, the average age of white men at the time of selection to state supreme court benches
was 50.5, compared to 48.3 for non-white men and 46.4 for white women.  Martin & Pyle, 
supra note 12, at 41 tbl.1.  The average age of all state supreme court justices when they
attained the bench declined from 53 in 1980 and 1981 to 49.4 in 1999. Id. at 41. 
the 2009–2010 term (the most recent reported).  ABA, supra note 193, at 5.  During the 2011–
 196. See infra Table 7. 
197. 
ALI. 
This may be true also for lawyers who, later in their career, seek election to the 
198. According to the ABA, women filled 51% of all judicial clerkship positions during
2012 school year, however, women represented only 46.7% of law school enrollment.  Id.
 199. See infra Table 7. At the same time, as shown in Table 6, to a statistically significant
degree and holding other factors constant, judges who attended in-state undergraduate
institutions are less likely than otherwise to be female. See infra Table 6.
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As seen in Table 8, there are few statistically significant differences in
the relative characteristics of men and women chosen by the respective
selection methods.200  In other words, when male or female judges on average
tend to be more or less likely to have had a particular career path, that same
tendency usually is seen across all selection methods. There are three
exceptions, however, arising on benches in merit-selection states.  First, 
the significant overall private-practice differential between male and
female members of the bench is greatest by far in merit-selection states. 
Among those judges, nearly 89% of the men have practiced in the private
sector; only 74% of the women have done so.  Second, the difference between 
the men and women who have commercial- or business-law experience is
much greater in merit selection—25% and 15%, respectively—than elsewhere.
Third, a significantly greater percentage of women chosen by merit selection
have served judicial clerkships than their male counterparts36% compared
to 22%.  Although, as noted, female judges overall are more likely than male 
judges to have clerked, in no other selection method is the margin statistically
significant. 
For a closer look, Tables 9 and 10 show the results of multivariate analyses
of the career paths of judges chosen by merit selection and those chosen
by all other selection methods.201 In terms of prior legal experience, holding
all other factors constant, judges chosen by merit selection who have
private-practice experience are significantly less likely to be female than
those without private-practice experience.  Although judges chosen by
other selection methods who have practiced in the private sector also are 
less likely to be female than those with other career paths, the difference
is not statistically significant.  By contrast, holding everything else constant,
a merit-selected judge who has practiced in government is 40% more
likely to be a woman than a merit-selected judge without government-law 
experience. At the same time, a judge with prior government experience 
who is selected by any other method is no more likely to be a woman than 
one without prior government experience.  A judge selected by merit who
served a judicial clerkship is more than twice as likely to be a woman as
a judge who did not clerk; no similar disparity is seen among judges selected 
by other methods. 
In sum, female judges in merit-selection states are considerably less
likely to have private-practice or business-law experience than male judges
 200. See infra Table 8. 
201. See infra Table 9, Table 10. 
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in merit-selection states or than female judges in other states.202  By itself,
the relatively low rate of women in private practice does not explain why
proportionately fewer women are chosen by merit selection than by other
selection methods.  It is not simply that merit selection prefers private-
practice and business-law experience:  other selection methods in which 
women succeed at about the same rate as they are represented in the bar 
choose even higher percentages of judges with private-practice experience 
than does merit selection.203 
One possible explanation consistent with the data is that merit selection 
does not value women’s private-practice and business-law experience to the
same degree as it values men’s private-practice and business-law experience, 
and does not value women’s private-practice and business-law experience
to the same degree that other selection methods do. Why might this be so? 
The explanation may lie in the nature of women’s private-practice experiences.
As discussed, female judges’ private-practice careers are shorter than those 
of male judges. This is true across the bar: according to a 2005 ABA study,
81.1% of all women thirty-nine years of age or younger were in private 
practice; of women forty years and older, that percentage dropped to 65.1%.204 
The subjective nature of the commercial-law demographic and the ambiguity 
of the available data sources makes it difficult to track the duration of the 
judges’ respective experiences in business law or complex litigation, but 
there is no reason to conclude that the same distinction does not exist in the
respective careers of the male judges and the female judges who come from 
that subset of private practice.
202. As shown in Table 11, of the female judges selected by merit selection, 74% 
have practiced in the private sector; by contrast, 80% of female judges selected by other
means have private-practice experience.  For purposes of comparison, Table 11 shows that 
proportionately more of the male judges (nearly 89%) chosen by merit selection have
practiced in the private sector than the male judges chosen by other methods (85%).
Further, although the differences are not statistically significant, male judges who come to 
the bench through merit selection are more likely to have private-practice experience than 
in other selection methods. See infra Table 11.  The percentage of women who have prior
government-law experience is roughly the same across all selection methods, but men
selected by merit are less likely than men selected by other means to have served government 
in a non-prosecutorial role.  And, in contrast to their female counterparts, men chosen by
merit selection are not more likely to have served judicial clerkships (in fact, they are less 
likely to have done so than men selected by other means). See id.
203. As shown in Table 1, higher percentages of judges in election and legislative-
selection states have practiced in the private sector than in merit-selection states.  See infra 
Table 1.
204. Comparable figures for men were 87% and 73.6%, respectively. CARSON & PARK, 
supra note 192, at 9–10; see also TORRES-SPELLISCY ET AL., supra note 13, at 7 (“To the 
extent that Commissioners [in merit selection states] view being a partner as a mark of quality
for judicial nominating Commissions, the apparent discrimination inherent in the partnership 
track at law firms may stall the careers of more female judicial applicants.”).
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Viewing these facts through the lens of merit selection, women who have 
spent less time as partners at large law firms or in other business-law practices
may be less likely than their male counterparts to have formed significant
relationships with clients that can influence appointment in merit-selection 
states. Recall that critics of merit selection contend it unduly favors applicants 
supported by the traditionally powerful, including state bar leaders and
business interests. It seems possible that to the extent those interests carry 
weight in merit selection, they tend to favor male candidates over female
candidates.  Implicit bias may be at work, but more fundamentally, the nature
of women’s experiences in private practice may hinder them from gaining 
support among business interests and bar leadership in merit selection.205 
Fewer women in private practice are equity partners in their law firms;
it would seem to follow that fewer women manage significant business– 
client relationships for their firms.206  Put simply, to the extent that business
interests wield influence in merit selection, they may be more likely to exercise
that influence in favor of the lawyers who have represented them in significant 
roles, and, at least to date, those lawyers tend to be male, not female. 
Establishment and business interests are not the only influences brought
to bear on the nominating commission and the governor in merit selection, 
and merit does not seem to advantage men over women when they share
career paths other than private practice.  In fact, as noted, merit selection
is a more favorable path to the bench for women than men with prior non­
prosecutorial government service.207  Nationwide, on a proportionate basis, half
again as many more female lawyers than male lawyers are in government 
service.208  Consistent with female lawyers’ greater representation in government 
service, proportionately more female judges than male judges are former
government lawyers, although the difference is not statistically significant 
205. See ESTERLING & ANDERSEN, supra note 34, at 11 (nominating commissions “should
incorporate the value of diversity into their deliberations”); TORRES-SPELLISCY ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 2, 11, 36 (urging judicial nominating commissions to “grapple fully with
implicit bias”).
206. A random survey of cases filed in the Northern District of Illinois in 2013 showed
that “[i]n civil cases, men are three times more likely than women to appear as lead counsel
and to appear as trial attorneys.”  SCHARF & LIEBENBERG, supra note 193, at 4.  The disparity is
even more pronounced in litigation typically involving business: 85% of lead counsel in 
contract cases were men. Id. at 10.
 207. See infra Table 11. 
208. CARSON & PARK, supra note 192, at 9.  According to data collected in 2005, 3.9% 
of all employed male lawyers practiced in state or local government; 6.5% of all employed
female lawyers did so.  Id.
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across all selection methods.209 The difference is greatest among merit-selected 
judges, however, where 28% of the female judges but only 19% of the male 
judges have prior non-prosecutorial governmental service.210 Some contend 
that women are more likely to find equal opportunity in public-sector jobs
than in the private sector.211 To the extent that is true for female lawyers, it
suggests that, in general, women may succeed in government practice to
a greater degree than in private practice.212  Perhaps that explains why 
merit selection seems to value prior government-law experience among 
women more than it values their prior private-practice experience.213 
Other objective credentials also advantage a woman seeking appointment
through merit selection.  A judicial clerkship is much more valuable to a 
woman in a merit-selection state than in a state with another selection method. 
Recall that, holding all other factors constant, a merit-selected judge who
has served a clerkship is more than twice as likely to be a woman than one
without a clerkship.214  Although merit selection chooses about the same 
percentage of former law clerks as other selection systems, by a significant 
margin, it chooses more women than men who have clerked.215 
By the same token, about the same proportion13%of the female judges 
and the male judges on merit-selected benches graduated from ranked law 
schools.216 That is about the average among all the male judges, but only 8%
of all the female judges graduated from ranked law schools.217  These data
indicate that, by contrast to private-practice experience and commercial- or 
business-law experience, a degree from a ranked law school is an objective 
209. See infra Table 7. 
210. See infra Table 8.  Consistent with these results, holding all other factors constant, a
merit-selected judge who comes from government service is 40% more likely to be a woman 
than a judge with another career path. See infra Table 9.
 211. See, e.g., DAVID COOPER, MARY GABLE & ALGERNON AUSTIN, ECON. POLICY
INST., THE PUBLIC-SECTOR JOBS CRISIS 2 (2012) (“Though discrimination in the public 
sector likely still exists, government remains a model of how to achieve greater equality
in employment and workplace diversity.” (citation omitted)).
212. A random study of cases filed in the Northern District of Illinois in 2013 showed “a
greater likelihood of women being lead counsel in civil cases” in which a government entity—
federal, state or municipal—was a party.  SCHARF & LIEBENBERG, supra note 193, at 11. 
213. Similarly, as shown in Tables 1 and 8, although merit selection chooses far fewer 
former prosecutors than former private practitioners, about the same percentage of women 
as men selected by merit are former prosecutors. See infra Table 1, Table 8. 
214. Compare infra Table 9, with infra Table 10. A judicial clerkship also advantages a
female judicial aspirant in other selection systems, but not to the same degree. 
215. See infra Table 1, Table 8.
 216. See infra Table 8. 
217. See infra Table 7. 
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credential to which merit selection gives equal and considerable weight, 
regardless of gender.218 
In summary, it seems quite possible that the underrepresentation of 
women on appellate benches in merit-selection states may be related to how
merit selection treats women’s private-practice experience.  By all analyses,
female judicial candidates from private practice and those with commercial-
and business-law experience do not succeed at the same rate as men with 
those career paths in merit selection and as comparable women in other
selection systems.  These results may lend support to the proposition that, 
as critics have argued, merit selection may unduly advantage judicial 
aspirants who have developed strong relationships with business and other 
establishment interests.  To the extent that, for whatever reason, women in 
private practice have not developed those relationships, they may be 
disadvantaged by merit selection.  The same gender differences are not seen
among benches in merit-confirmation states, where the governor’s choice 
of whom to appoint is constrained by a confirmation requirement.  This topic
deserves additional research, but perhaps whatever gender disparities result
from the influence that business interests wield in merit selection in favor 
of lawyers who have represented them in private practice are outweighed 
in merit-confirmation by the wider universe of political interests implicated
by a confirmation requirement. 
The persistent gender disparity on merit-selected appellate benches argues
in favor of continued efforts among judicial nominating commissions and
governors in merit-selection states to recruit diverse judicial applicants and 
give fair weight to comparable experiences of female candidates.219 At the
same time, the data also show that merit selection fairly recognizes and values 
other prior legal experience and credentials in women. Merit selection seems
218. Among judges selected by other methods, by a statistically significant margin, 
a judge who attended a ranked law school is less likely to be a woman.  Compare infra Table 
9, with infra Table 10. 
219. For example, a business executive in a merit-selection state may contact the
nominating commission or the governor with praise for a judicial candidate to whom that
executive entrusted his company’s representation in a high-stakes negotiation or litigation.
That opinion is entitled to due weight, but best practices would require commission members 
and the governor also to consciously consider whether another candidate with a different
career path may have comparable intellect, judgment, integrity and perspective.  See Joseph A.
Colquitt, Rethinking Judicial Nominating Commissions: Independence, Accountability, 
and Public Support, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 73, 90, 118, 120 (2007); Steven Zeidman, Careful 
What You Wish For: Tough Questions, Honest Answers, and Innovative Approaches to Appointive 
Judicial Selection, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473, 476–78 (2007); TORRES-SPELLISCY ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 11–12. 
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to give equal weight to a woman’s prior prosecutorial experience as it gives
to a man’s.  And, to a greater extent than other selection methods, merit
selection seems to value a woman’s other government-law experience. Merit 
selection also seems to afford significantly greater weight to a judicial clerkship 
served by a woman than by a man; this may afford success to a woman who
has served a clerkship but lacks private-practice or business-law experience. 
Along with a judicial clerkship, a degree from a ranked law school is another 
credential of intellectual competence that may help a female applicant 
succeed in merit selection even if she is unable to call on business interests
for support with the nominating commission or the governor.
E. Non-Whites on State Appellate Benches 
As shown in the chart below, from barely more than 5% of judges selected 
before 1990, non-whites now make up nearly 15% of the members of state 
appellate courts.220  That percentage is only  slightly below the rate at 
which non-whites today are represented in the national labor market for 
lawyers. According to the U.S. Statistical Abstract, 15.7% of the employed 







<1990 1991‐95 1996‐00 2001‐05 2006‐10 2011‐15 All Time 
Periods 
Non‐White Judges on State Courts of 
Last Resort and Intermediate Appellate 
Courts in 2015 (by Percent), by Year of 
Selection 
220. This study classed Black, Asian, Hispanic and Latino judges together as non-white.
221. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 180, at 3 tbl.11. 
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Study of the proportion of non-whites among the members of the bar in 
each state is beyond the scope of this project, but Reddick found in 2008 
that “states with a higher percentage of minority attorneys were more
likely to have minority judges,” both in their appellate courts and on their 
trial benches.222 Further, that relationship existed without regard to the political
affiliation of the governor or party registration numbers.223  Alozie likewise
found that the proportion of Hispanic and black judges in a state correlated
to the percentage of Hispanics and blacks among the practicing bar.224 
Table 12 shows that, viewed broadly, although there are some differences
among selection methods in the rates at which non-whites have been selected 
to the bench, they are not statistically significant.225  Categorized by formal 
selection methods, between 12.55% and 17.24% of appellate judges sitting in
2015 are non-whites.  The significant drop-off in the proportion of women
who come to the bench in merit-selection states is not seen among non­
whites.  Although only non-partisan election states have a smaller percentage 
than merit selection of non-whites on their appellate benches, non-whites 
are not statistically significantly disadvantaged in merit-selection states.
The respective presence of non-whites on the appellate bench in election 
states, however, is due in large part to the appointing authorities, not to
the voters. By a statistically significant margin, judges who are appointed to
fill interim vacancies in election states are more likely to be non-white than
their colleagues who first come to the bench by election in those states— 
18% compared to 11%. The margin is the starkest in non-partisan election 
states.226 Based on their study of state courts of last resort in election states
 222. REDDICK ET AL., supra note 69, at 6. 
223. Id.
 224. Alozie, supra note 65, at 318, 324. Alozie examined Hispanics and blacks separately
and found no indication that increased Hispanic voter registration may cause appointing
authorities to appoint more Hispanics.  Id. at 320.  He found, however, that increases in 
the number of Hispanic voters do significantly increase Hispanics’ chances of winning the
bench in partisan-election states. Id.  The same was not true with blacks, however.  He
speculated that, while voters can readily distinguish Hispanic judicial candidates by their
names, that is not so with black candidates.  Id. at 323. 
225. See infra Table 12. 
226. See infra Table 3.  These findings are not inconsistent with those of Reddick et 
al., who concluded that 89.2% of all minority judges on state courts of last resort in 2008
were selected by gubernatorial appointment (including merit, merit-confirmation and appointment 
to fill interim vacancies in election states).  REDDICK ET AL., supra note 69, at 4 tbl.2.  That 
percentage is significantly higher than the proportion (67.1%) of all the state high court judges 
in the study who were appointed by a governor.  Id.  Their multivariate analysis also concluded 
that, in considering judges on state high courts, “[a]ppointive methods” (of all varieties) were 
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from 1964–2004, Holmes and Emery likewise observed that non-white judges
are advantaged by interim appointment.227 Although only 4% of first-elected 
judges in Holmes et. al’s study were non-white, 11% of the judges appointed
to fill interim vacancies were non-white.228  Given the relatively small 
representation of non-whites on state appellate benches at the time of this
study, it is difficult to draw statistically significant data-based explanations
for these observations.  Non-whites seeking election to the bench, however,
face the usual obstacles encountered by minority political candidates when
the relevant voter pool is not substantially diverse.229  On the other hand, 
when governors fill interim vacancies by appointment in election states, 
they may be more inclined than the general electorate to select non-white 
candidates.230 
Finally, as shown in Table 7, non-whites are statistically significantly
overrepresented among female judges in the data set.  While nearly 21% of 
the female judges are non-white, just under half that figureroughly 11%
of the male judges are non-white. 
CONCLUSIONS
The data collected for the current study reveal significant distinctions
among the benches chosen by the various selection methods.
Close study of the selection mechanisms in the various states that employ 
what prior studies broadly have called “appointment” systems reveals that 
gubernatorial appointments in those states in fact are subject to two significant 
constraintsan independent nominating commission akin to that mandated 
in merit-selection states, and a legal requirement that the governor’s choice
be confirmed by a separately elected body before the appointee may take
more favorable to minorities than elections. Id. at 6 tbl.3.  For state intermediate appellate 
courts, however, they found no relationship between selection method and racial diversity.
Id. at 6. 
227.  Holmes & Emrey, supra note 169, at 7.
 228. Id. They also found that while 15% of interim appointments by Democratic governors 
were of non-whites, Republican governors appointed non-whites at the rate of 7%. Id. at 10. 
229.  Writing about the black experience in Michigan, where judges are chosen by direct
election, Crockett observed that “blacks were not appointed to judicial vacancies in anything
like representative numbers until the late 1960’s when their voting potential reached the point
where they could elect black judges of their own selection and were no longer dependent 
on appointments[.]”  Crockett, supra note 55, at 442.  When Reddick studied the environment
from which appellate judges on the bench in 2008 were drawn, she concluded that “statewide 
selection may have enhanced prospects for women to serve on courts of last resort but 
limited such opportunities for minorities.”  She cited data showing that although 80.3% of 
judges on state courts of last resort were selected on a statewide basis, 83.7% of female judges
and 75.7% of minority judges were selected in that manner.  REDDICK ET AL., supra note 
69, at 4.
 230. REDDICK ET AL., supra note 69, at 4. 
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the bench.  These constraints in merit-confirmation states result in distinctive
appellate benches, with more former prosecutors and government lawyers, 
more former trial court judges, and fewer judges who come from private
practice.  Judges chosen by merit-confirmation also have had longer legal
careers than judges selected by other means, and more have served judicial 
clerkships. 
Otherwise, the objective characteristics of appellate judges in election states 
are significantly different in only a handful of respects from those of judges
appointed through merit selection and merit-confirmation.  More of the
judges in election states than in merit-selection or merit–confirmation states
come from private practice, fewer of them have prior judicial experience, and 
more of them were educated locally.  But prior researchers understood that 
the objective characteristics of judges appointed to fill interim vacancies 
in election states are not very different from those of judges who first 
come to the bench by election.  The data in this study demonstrate that is not 
so: in several respects, most notably race, appointed judges in election states 
are significantly different from their elected counterparts, in ways that tend
to bring the characteristics of the entire elected bench more in line with
the norm across all selection methods. 
The data do not offer conclusive explanations for these findings, which 
deserve additional research.  It seems possible that to the extent the characteristics 
of appellate judges in merit-confirmation states are different from those 
of judges in merit-selection states, the reason has less to do with the governor’s
appointment power and more to do with the power of the elected body that
must confirm an appointment.  Further study might be directed to the factors 
at play when governors or other authorities in election states fill interim 
vacancies on the appellate bench by appointment, and why they so frequently
select judges who are distinctively different in some respects from the 
appointees’ elected colleagues.
Across all states, women are represented on state appellate benches at a
rate slightly higher than their numbers among the practicing bar, nationwide. 
By a significant margin, however, female candidates are disadvantaged by 
merit selection, but not by merit-confirmation.  Additional study of the
characteristics of judicial applicants in merit-selection states, compared to
those of the candidates that nominating commissions advance and the judges
the governors finally appoint, may help explain the disparity. How the
confirmation requirement in merit-confirmation states affects a governor’s
decision of whether to appoint a man or a woman also deserves scrutiny.  At
present, however, the data suggest that merit selection does not value private­
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practice or business-law experience in women to the same extent it 
values that experience in men, and does not value such experience in women
to the same extent as other selection methods do.  Insofar as this anomaly
may be related to women’s difficulties in mustering support among so-called
establishment or business interests that are thought to wield power in
merit selection, conscious efforts by the nominating commission and the
governor to give thoughtful consideration to the career paths of female 
candidates may overcome that disadvantage.  In the meantime, merit selection 
favors women with prior government-law experience and those who can
demonstrate objective intellectual credentials such as a judicial clerkship or 
a degree from a ranked law school.
Finally, non-whites are represented across and within all selection methods 
at rates roughly equivalent to their representation in the bar.  By a significant
margin, however, non-whites on the bench in election states were first 
appointed, not elected.  And overall, women on the appellate bench are
disproportionately non-white.  These disparities also deserve further attention. 
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TABLES
* “Average” in this Table means the average for all those judges in the
    category who share the designated legal experience or characteristic. 
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Table 2: Judges in Merit-Selection and Merit-Confirmation States, Election States 











N Judges 1285 362 269 631 620 
% Women 35.23 28.73 36.43 0.0403 32.01 38.52 0.016 
% Non-White 14.55 14.09 17.47 0.3515 15.24 13.8 0.471 




24.9 25.02 27 0.0002 25.86 23.96 0 
Former judicial law
clerk (by %) 
26.61 26.24 31.97 0.1034 28.57 25.04 0.158 
Prior judicial 
experience (by %) 
64.11 62.98 74.72 0.0017 67.99 60.19 0.004 
Private-practice 
experience (by %) 
83.27 84.53 74.35 0.0015 80.19 86.47 0.003 
Average* yrs private 
practice 
13.92 14.08 13.52 0.4827 13.86 13.99 0.8152 
Commercial 
law/business law
experience (by %) 
23.35 22.1 24.54 0.4738 23.14 22.79 0.885 
Prosecutorial 
experience (by %) 
37.82 34.25 43.87 0.014 38.35 37.72 0.818 
Average yrs
prosecutor 
8.64 8.48 9.08 0.4754 8.78 8.49 0.6422 
Gov't law 
experience (non­
prosecutor) (by %) 
24.64 21.82 32.71 0.0021 26.47 22.79 0.131 
Average yrs gov't
lawyer 




11.75 11.05 11.15 0.9677 11.09 12.38 0.479 
Average yrs legal 
aid/crim defense 
6.33 6.32 6.04 0.8424 6.2 6.6 0.7241 
In-state law school
(by %) 
73.15 71.27 61.34 0.0086 67.04 78.81 0 
Ranked law school
(by %) 
11.53 13.26 16.73 0.2248 14.76 7.7 0 
In-state undergrad
(by %) 
62.88 62.12 49.44 0.0015 56.71 69.74 0 
Ranked undergrad
(by %) 
14.5 14.36 18.22 0.1926 16.01 13.2 0.161 
Taught in college or
law school (by %) 
25.99 24.03 33.09 0.0121 27.89 23.92 0.108 
Elected to ALI (by
%) 




13.46 13.54 13.01 0.8481 13.31 13.32 0.996 
Average prior law
review  articles 
2.46 2.18 4.17 0.0278 3.01 1.83 0.0167 
*  “Average” in this Table means the average of all those judges in the 
 category who share the designated legal experience or characteristic. 
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* “Average” in this table means the average of all those judges in the
   category who share the designated legal experience or characteristic. 
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Table 4: Judges in Partisan Election States, Non-Partisan Election States 












N Judges 1285 616 660 360 263 
% Women 35.18 38.52 32.12 0.016 39.44 37.26 0.58 
% Non-White 14.55 13.8 15.33 0.732 14.72 12.55 0.4378 
Age at selection 51.45 50.78 52.08 0.0017 50.91 50.6 0.6306 
Years post-law school at
selection 24.94 23.96 25.86 0 23.97 23.94 0.956 
Former judicial law clerk (by %) 26.61 25.04 28.22 0.198 22.22 28.9 0.0577 
Average* yrs as judicial law clerk 1.86 1.97 1.78 0.509 2.27 1.66 0.0746 
Prior judicial experience (by %) 64.12 60.19 67.88 0.0041 61.94 57.79 0.2967 
Average prior yrs as a judge 10.98 10.7 11.21 0.2579 11.44 9.61 0.006 
Private practice experience (by
%) 83.27 86.47 80.45 0.004 86.07 87.02 0.7328 
Average yrs private practice 13.92 13.99 13.86 0.8061 13.73 14.32 0.4642 
Commercial law/business law 
experience (by %) 23.35 22.79 23.79 0.674 21.67 24.33 0.4338 
Prosecutorial experience (by %) 37.82 37.72 38.03 0.909 40.83 33.46 0.0609 
Average yrs prosecutor 8.71 8.49 8.9 0.5142 8.25 8.88 0.4984 
Gov't law experience  (non­
prosecutor) (by %) 24.82 22.79 26.67 0.108 23.89 21.29 0.4463 
Average yrs  gov't  lawyer (non-
prosecutor) 7.75 7.11 8.22 0.1537 6.42 8 0.1249 
Legal aid/crim defense
experience (by %) 11.75 12.38 11.21 0.517 11.11 14.12 0.261 
Average yrs  legal aid/crim
defense 6.34 6.6 6.1 0.6587 5.71 7.19 0.4254 
In-state law school (by %) 73.15 78.81 67.73 0 83.89 71.86 0.0003 
Ranked law school (by %) 11.53 7.7 15.02 0 3.06 14.07 0 
In-state undergrad (by %) 62.88 69.74 57.25 0 75 62.6 0.0009 
Ranked undergrad (by %) 14.5 13.2 15.61 0.222 9.17 18.63 0.0005 
Taught in college or law school
(by %) 25.99 23.92 28.03 0.093 21.67 27 0.1239 
Elected to ALI (by %) 7 7.06 6.97 0.948 8.06 5.7 0.2584 
Authored prior law review 
article(s) 13.46 13.32 13.48 0.932 10.56 17.11 0.0174 
Average prior law review articles 2.46 1.83 3.04 0.0127 1.55 2.07 0.1774 
*  “Average” in this Table means the average of all those judges in the  
 category who share the designated legal experience or characteristic. 
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† Table 8 continues on the next page.
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